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Abstract 
 
 In this paper, I analyze recent economic and political trends by providing 
an in depth look at the National Heritage Area (NHA) program. By tracing their 
conception and origination back to the early 1980s, I attempt to place NHAs 
within the larger framework of deindustrialization and government cutbacks that 
were occurring at the time. Furthermore, I show how, with their emphasis on 
building social capital and creating cross-jurisdictional ties, NHAs were a natural 
response to emerging “new regionalist” ideals in America. By embracing the 
concept of regional partnerships to enhance economic competitiveness, NHAs 
signaled a new drive towards geographical thinking throughout much of the 
country. 
 After providing a quick survey of the existing academic literature, I take a 
closer look at the NHA program by making use of three case studies. In telling the 
stories of these three areas, I attempt to show why there has been such an 
increasing demand for NHA designation in recent years. 
 Finally, I show that, because of a lack of enforced standards, the NHA 
program has become susceptible to partisan forces, both locally and on Capitol 
Hill. Furthermore, I use testimony from National Park Service officials to show 
that the program is now in real danger of running out of funds. With such a 
flawed system of designation, I end by posing some critical questions for a 
program in need of a direction. 
 Ultimately, I conclude that, while these issues are troubling, the true 
significance of the NHA program comes from its reliance upon the idea of 
geographical place. By embracing the power of geography to drive economic 
competitiveness, NHAs are just one example of how spatial concerns have 
become increasingly important in today’s society.  
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Introduction: National Heritage Areas                            
More than Meets the Eye 
“If you would converse with me, you must first define your terms."  - Voltaire 
What, exactly, is a National Heritage Area? Many Americans would be 
surprised to learn that there is a fairly good chance, about one in three, that they 
live in one.1 In fact, in the Northeastern United States, it is difficult to find a place 
more than a couple hours’ drive away from one of these regions (Appendix, 
Figure 1). With 49 designations in 32 states, National Heritage Areas (NHAs) 
cover more ground and contain more people than any other land use program in 
the history of the United States.2 
Designated by Congress and affiliated with the National Park Service 
(NPS), heritage areas are nominally recognized as federal entities. However, 
unlike their more glamorous older sibling, the National Park, heritage areas are 
not managed directly by the federal government. The NPS provides funding and 
technical assistance, but it does not own any land and is prohibited from 
exercising control over property rights, environmental standards, or land use 
                                                          
1 Heather Scotten, Assistant Coordinator of National Heritage Area Program, National Park 
Service. Telephone interview, 26 October 2010.  
 
2 Ibid.  
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regulations of any kind3. In this relationship, it is the private sector that holds the 
reins of power, with the park service relegated to the role of watchful guardian. 
Although there is no set formula for designation, heritage areas usually 
arise through the cooperative efforts of local stakeholders, from chambers of 
commerce to preservationist groups, public officials, and even ordinary citizens. 
These stakeholders then begin the long process of lobbying Congress for a 
recognition of “national significance” on behalf of their region. If they are 
successful, the stakeholders are officially recognized as a governing body for the 
new heritage area, and Congress grants them three years to formulate a 
management plan and have it approved by the Secretary of the Interior.4 At this 
point, the area becomes eligible to receive federal dollars and technical advice, 
which is then supplemented with state, local, and private funds in order to further 
the stated goals of the management plan. 
When it comes to defining an overall theme or purpose for the NHA 
movement, the existing literature is disappointingly vague. Due to the nature of 
the program, no two regions have the same stated goals, and because each area is 
designated on a case-by-case basis, management plans tend to differ widely in 
their function. Indeed, with the scale of heritage areas ranging from just a few 
                                                          
3 US House, Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests and Lands, Hearings on HR 1280: To 
establish guidelines for the purpose of National Heritage Area Programs and other purposes. 28 
March 1995. 104
th
 Cong., 1
st
 Sess. Web. 28 December 2010. 21.                     
 
4 Katie Durcan, Assistant Coordinator of National Heritage Area Program, National Park Service. 
Telephone interview, 3 November 2010. 
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counties to the entire state of Tennessee,5 articulating a common purpose would 
seem a hopeless task. However, upon closer inspection, some broad, unifying 
themes begin to emerge.  
According to the National Park Service, heritage areas are similar in that 
they offer “Nationally distinctive cultural, historic, scenic, and natural resources 
that, when linked together, tell a unique story about our country.”6 This idea of a 
“nationally significant” narrative is prominent in most descriptions of the 
program, with the idea being that designation will serve to promote, and 
ultimately protect, that region’s history.  In the words of one non-profit group, the 
definitive goal of the heritage area movement is simply “to recognize, preserve 
and celebrate America's defining landscapes.”7 
Thus, at first glance, National Heritage Areas are, to put it bluntly, exactly 
what they sound like: areas of exceptionally rich heritage, recognized at the 
national level and assisted by the federal government. It is a simple concept: easy 
to understand, easy to explain, and largely unobjectionable to the general public. 
If the story were to end right here, it would make for a vaguely interesting 
but wholly unremarkable tale, best suited for the back pages of travel brochures or 
                                                          
5 “Interactive Map of National Heritage Areas,” National Park Service. 9 October 2009. Web. 28 
December 2010. 
 
6 “National Heritage Area FAQs,” National Park Service. 11 August 2010. Web. 3 January 2011. 
 
7 “What is a National Heritage Area?” The Alliance of National Heritage Areas. 13 December 
2010. Web. 3 January 2011. 
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government websites. However, the next few chapters of the heritage area story 
prove to be much more nuanced, controversial and, ultimately, more exciting.  
A Weapon in the War for Economic Stability 
While historic preservation is certainly an important part of the equation, it 
is not, and never has been, the true catalyst for the heritage areas movement. 
Beneath their sunny, feel-good exterior, heritage areas are often viewed as useful 
tools in the struggle to attain economic stability. In many cases, they allow 
otherwise fragmented regions to coalesce around a shared identity, strengthening 
community ties and improving local morale. In other cases, they provide regions 
with the opportunity to showcase an attractive image, making themselves more 
amenable to prospective tourists and businesses. Essentially, for many 
communities across the country, NHAs represent far more than mere badges of 
pride and recognition. Rather, they represent a tangible opportunity for 
municipalities to work together towards the common goal of economic prosperity. 
Of course, no historical movement can be analyzed in a vacuum, and so it 
becomes necessary to contextualize the development of heritage areas within the 
larger scheme of economic and social history. 
Indeed, looking back to the origination of NHAs in the early 1980s, 
evidence seems to suggest that heritage areas were a natural outgrowth of 
changing economic and fiscal conditions in the United States. During this period, 
there was a concerted effort to deemphasize the role of the central government in 
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many domestic affairs, especially those involving aid to inner cities. At the same 
time, there was a continuing trend towards deindustrialization across much of the 
country, a trend exacerbated by Reagan-era cutbacks in federal assistance. Thus, 
as is often the case in periods of great crisis, many localities felt compelled to 
search for new methods of economic sustainability to compete in an era of scarce 
resources. 
In this climate of fiscal austerity, cities often were left to fend for 
themselves, a situation that frequently placed them into direct geographic 
competition with each other. For these cities hoping to compete with distant 
rivals, it often made sense to partner with immediate neighbors in order to 
increase their economic clout. By forming rich, mutually-reinforcing webs of 
social connectedness, many regions found they could attain a level of innovation 
and productivity greater than the sum of their parts. In time, this capacity to form 
inter-jurisdictional partnerships, known as “regional clusters,” would come to be 
seen as a key advantage in an economy dominated by the free flow of money and 
ideas. 
As I will attempt to make clear in this paper, I believe that the heritage 
area movement was, at least in part, a reaction to this new trend towards regional 
development. By forging a common consensus around the theme of geographical 
identity, heritage areas felt they could generate the enthusiasm and grassroots 
activism needed to transform individual towns and cities into larger, more 
cohesive units. In this sense, support from the federal government was modest but 
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essential; by legitimizing an area’s claims of “national significance,” designation 
effectively served as the nucleus around which a regional framework could be 
built. Once this legitimacy was “seeded” from above, heritage areas then could 
begin to create a reputation for themselves, attracting tourists and new businesses 
in an effort to attain economic stability.  
Too Much of A Good Thing? 
By the mid-1990s, heritage areas had gained the reputation as potential 
moneymakers, and as such, they became a hot commodity on the political market 
(Appendix, Figure 2). Even today, the popularity of the program is continuing to 
increase. As of April 2011, there are ten proposals waiting to be reviewed by 
Congress along with dozens more in the early planning stages8. Although 
quantitative evidence is lacking, there is at least the belief among the program’s 
followers that heritage areas are major difference-makers in the race to attain 
comparative geographical advantages. In a purely perceptual sense, then, the 
program must be viewed as an unqualified success. However, despite the 
movement’s popularity and largely unobjectionable reputation, there remain some 
inherent flaws in the overall structure of the program.  
For one, there is a major disconnect between how heritage areas present 
themselves to the public and how they are perceived in more elite circles. While 
the program’s preservationist and historical credentials are frequently celebrated, 
                                                          
8  Katie Durcan, Op. cit.  
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the public rarely hears about its more tangible function as an agent of regional 
competitiveness. More troubling, however, is the lack of defined criteria for what 
these regions actually are. There is no agreed-upon definition for what constitutes 
“national significance,” nor is there any objective measure to determine which 
regions deserve designation and which do not. More often, designation is simply 
determined by which regions have the political connections needed to gain access 
to Capitol Hill. In fact, once a heritage area bill reaches Congress, it is virtually 
guaranteed to pass, regardless of its legislative merits.  
Lastly, as more areas continue to be designated, it is unlikely that the Park 
Service will be able to find the resources needed to support them all. With such a 
lax designation process and no enforceable mechanisms for terminating funding, 
the heritage area program seems destined to outgrow the relatively limited amount 
of funds set aside for its continuation. 
Thus, while heritage areas might seem like a good idea in theory; in 
practice, the program is rife with misconceptions and inconsistencies. By 
presenting a public image so out of step with its actual goals, it obscures what is, 
in effect, a geographical struggle for scarce economic resources. In this struggle, 
some regions are fortunate enough to receive a boost from the federal government 
while others are not. Furthermore, given the way the program currently is 
structured, regions obtain federal assistance, not because they have intrinsically 
better claims to historical or cultural significance, but rather because their 
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organizational prowess allows them to compete more effectively in the political 
arena. 
To some, this arrangement may seem unfair. To others, it may seem a 
natural and justifiable reaction to economic trends that are beyond these regions’ 
immediate control. Either way, one fact remains unmistakably clear: the heritage 
area program, despite its humble reputation, offers a much more compelling story 
than originally meets the eye. 
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Chapter 1: Competition through Cooperation 
The Economic Factors Behind NHA Development 
  
“A pessimist sees the difficulty in every opportunity; an optimist sees the 
opportunity in every difficulty.”    - Winston Churchill  
 
In Flint, Michigan, the housing market is so depressed that many homes sell 
for just a dollar apiece.9 In Youngstown, Ohio, public officials have taken to 
bulldozing entire neighborhoods in the hopes of reducing city maintenance 
costs.10 In Cleveland, population loss is occurring so rapidly that, if one week’s 
worth of emigrants were to leave simultaneously, they would be able to fill the 
seats of two full-size Greyhound buses.11 In Detroit, if one were to lay out all of 
the city’s vacant lots side by side, the resulting space would be large enough to 
cover the entire city of San Francisco.12 
As incredible as these facts may seem, they nevertheless fail to convey the 
full degree of hardship and pain felt by so many of America’s industrial cities 
since the 1960s. It was a hardship caused, not by any particular fault of the cities 
themselves, but rather by a series of economic and fiscal changes arising at the 
                                                          
9 Tracy Samilton, “Flint, Michigan Sheds Foreclosed Properties,” NPR News. 20 October   2007. 
Web 5 January 2011. 
 
10 Les Christie, “The Incredible Shrinking City,” CNN Money. 24 April 2008. Web. 4 January 2011   
 
11 Timothy Homan, “Cleveland Third Nationwide in Population Loss,” The Columbus Dispatch. 24 
.March 2010. Web. 5 January 2011.  
 
12 Michael McKee and Alex Ortolani, “GM’s Bust Turns Detroit into Urban Lot Prairie of Vacant  
Lot Farms,” Bloomberg News. 8 December 2008. Web. 4 January 2011.                                                     
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national and international levels. In a very real sense then, these urban localities 
were victims of economic forces entirely beyond their control. However, while 
these problems originated from outside sources, their solutions would have to 
come from within.  
In an age of increasingly scarce resources, the keys to economic success 
often lay in a community’s ability to create geographical linkages and innovative 
partnerships across jurisdictional lines. Ultimately, in this new cutthroat economy, 
cities would have to cooperate in order to compete.    
An Unstoppable Force: American Manufacturing After WWII 
Many historians refer to the 1900s as “The American Century,” and after 
looking at the economic data, it is not difficult to see why.13 In 1945, as much of 
Europe and Asia lay in ruins, the United States emerged from the rubble of WWII 
as an economic superpower, ready to unleash its concentrated industrial might 
upon the world. In those brief, fast-paced years, half of the world’s manufactured 
products were made in America. Consumer confidence and union membership 
were high while unemployment and inflation were low.14 By the mid-1950s, 
despite the notable exclusion of women and minorities, the American Dream 
finally seemed attainable to the expanding middle class. In many ways, the 20 
                                                          
13 Walter LaFeber, et. al., The American Century: A History of the United States Since the 1890s 
(New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2008) Preface: xiii.   
 
14 Ibid. 347. 
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years after WWII, while not without some dips and panics, remain unmatched in 
their creation of prosperity for the average American worker. 
By the late 1960s, however, the first stirrings of long-term fiscal troubles 
were becoming apparent. Inflation inched above 5% in 1969, only to explode four 
years later as a series of supply shocks led to dramatic shortages in the world’s 
energy market.15 As the decade wore on, economists began to refer ominously to 
the new trend of “stagflation,” a seemingly counterintuitive combination of 
inflation and slowed growth.16 
During these difficult times, no sector of the American economy was hit 
harder than heavy industry. In the 40 years between 1969 and 2009, the 
percentage of the American workforce engaged in manufacturing fell from 26 
percent to less than 10 percent.17 Throughout the 70s, 80s, and 90s, this decline 
was reflected mostly by a shrinking ratio of manufacturing jobs to service sector 
jobs, rather than an actual loss in industrial employment. However, following the   
2000 - 2002 recession, nearly five million manufacturing jobs were lost outright, 
dropping payrolls to their lowest level since the Great Depression.18 
                                                          
15 John Early, et. al., “A Half-year Pause in Inflation: Its Antecedents and Structure,” Monthly 
Labor Review 109 (1986): 4.                                                                                    
 
16 Alan Blinder, Economic Policy and the Great Stagflation (New York: Academic Press, 1981) 11. 
 
17 “Manufacturing Employment by Year,” Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2 January 2011. Web.         
.7 January 2011. 
 
18  Ibid. 
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In the existing literature, there are many competing explanations for this 
apparent decline in American industrial prowess. However, while these 
conflicting narratives merit further study, the exact reasons for deindustrialization 
are not necessary for the scope of this paper. Instead, it is sufficient to 
acknowledge that, by the 1970s, much of America was suffering from a 
slowdown in economic activity, the worst of which was occurring within the 
sector of heavy manufacturing. 
Urban Areas in Decline: America’s Rust Belt 
 For the country as a whole, America’s loss of industrial jobs can best be 
described as a chronic malady; although serious, it did not present an immediate 
danger to the survival of the national economy. For a few major cities in the Mid-
Atlantic and Inland North, however, the decline in manufacturing was a more 
acute problem, and its effects on the ground were nothing short of disastrous.19 
After centuries of rapid growth, the population of most major Northeastern cities 
began to decline after 1960, and in some cases, such as Detroit and Cleveland, 
they fell by more than 50%.20 As workers from these cities dispersed throughout 
the country, many chose to head south and west to the so-called Sun Belt, where 
the weather was nicer and the jobs more plentiful. Others, however, relocated to 
just a few miles beyond city limits, creating a massive, sprawling exurbia around 
                                                          
19 Marlene Lee and Mark Mather, “US Labor Force Trends,” Population Bulletin 63 (2008) 7. 
 
20 Brian Louis, “Rustbelt Cities Demolish Homes as Defaults Blight Neighborhoods,” Bloomberg 
News. 18 November 2010. Web. 19 December 2010 . 
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a hollow urban core. Left behind in this exodus from inner cities were the old, the 
poor, and the racially marginalized, forming a permanent underclass amongst the 
abandoned factories and vacant lots.21 
 By the 1970s, deindustrialization was largely seen as an urban problem. 
More specifically, it was seen as a problem highly concentrated among the 
manufacturing cities of the Upper Midwest.22 As bad as things were, however, 
they would only continue to get worse. During the late 70s and early 80s, a 
revolution in political thinking would begin to challenge the legitimacy of the 
nation’s vast network of urban assistance programs; programs which had been 
growing, largely uninterrupted, for nearly half a century. 
1933-1978: The Golden Age of Keynesian Economics  
In the midst of the Great Depression, Franklin Roosevelt assumed the 
presidency promising a “New Deal” for the American worker. In order to achieve 
this goal, Roosevelt would authorize a dramatic expansion in the role of the 
central government, approving massive federal outlays to states and localities in 
hopes of stimulating employment on the ground and demand in the markets. This 
plan, influenced by the work of British economist John Maynard Keynes, aimed 
                                                          
21 Thomas Sugrue. The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) Preface: xxi. 
 
22 Marlene Lee and Mark Mather, Op. Cit., 8. 
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to spread the benefits of full employment and high wages as evenly as possible, 
targeting struggling areas with offers of federal assistance.23 
In the 1960s under President Johnson, the United States redoubled its 
efforts to “level the playing field.”24 Social assistance programs and generous 
government grants to struggling municipalities became commonplace, and in 
1965, after the passage of Medicare, even the conservative economist Milton 
Friedman was forced to sourly admit that “We are all Keynesians now.”25 Indeed, 
by the mid 1970s, more than a quarter of all of the money spent by states and 
cities came directly from the federal treasury. 26 
Thus, even as deindustrialization took hold during the early 1970s, many 
urban areas managed to avoid its worst effects by relying upon the federal 
government for monetary assistance. By the end of the decade, however, a new 
shift in the political climate would force these cities to begin fending for 
themselves in an increasingly competitive fiscal environment.      
                                                          
23 Bob Jessop, “Post-Fordism and the State,” in A. Amin (Ed.) Post-Fordism: A Reader 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994) 254.                                                              
24 John E. Peck and Thomas R. Swartz, The Changing Face of Fiscal Federalism (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe Inc.,1990) 5. 
 
25 “The Economy: We Are all Keynesians Now,” Time Magazine. 31 December 1965. Web. 11 
January 2011.  
 
26 John E. Peck and Thomas R. Swartz, Op. Cit. 8 
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A Shock to the System: The Tax Revolt of 1978 
The first true blow to the New Deal/Keynesian consensus took place on 
June 6, 1978, when California voters overwhelmingly approved the Jarvis-Gunn 
Amendment, better known as Proposition 13. In less than 400 words, the new law 
completely gutted California’s most important source of revenue, lowering 
property tax returns by almost 60%. Over the next two-and-a-half years, no less 
than 22 states followed California’s example, leading to what many observers 
called “a full-scale tax revolt.”27  
In November of 1978, a poor Democratic showing in the midterm 
elections suggested that this newfound voter hostility was more than just a passing 
phase.28 Indeed, after 45 years of liberal dominance, a deep conservative backlash 
was beginning to take hold across the country. According to economist David 
Stoesz, there was a growing concern that New Deal economics had “violated 
citizens’ privacy and harmed growth by ‘confiscating’ private resources in the 
form of taxation for welfare expenditure.”29 In the opinion of fiscal conservatives, 
government, in the quest to ensure equality, had spent itself into oblivion, wasting 
                                                          
27 Ibid., 9. 
 
28 Jim Luther, “Election Results,” AP Newswire: AM Cycle. 8 November 1978. Web. 13 January 
2011. 
 
29 David Stoesz, “The Radical Right and the Welfare State,” in H. Glennester and J. Midgley (Eds.) 
The Radical Right and the Welfare State: An International Perspective (Oxford, Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1991) 31. 
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hard-earned tax dollars on programs that did little more than “reward failure” and 
foster “a culture of dependence.”30 
As frustration grew, President Carter stunned many of his closest 
supporters by announcing a new “lean and austere” budget, which reduced or 
eliminated many public works projects and local development initiatives.31 While 
certainly a bold move, Carter’s actions turned out to be too little, too late. The 
following year, Ronald Reagan captured the presidency in an electoral landslide, 
due in large part to his promises to take on what many saw as a bloated and 
inefficient government structure.  
Ronald Reagan and the New Federalism   
 While Carter aimed to streamline the existing federal system through 
incremental changes, Reagan sought nothing less than a complete redefinition of 
government’s role in society.32 The central government, he argued, had little 
business sticking its nose in issues like welfare assistance and subsidized housing, 
issues that could be dealt with most efficiently at the local level. If a locality 
wanted to spend its money on such programs, then so be it, but it should not 
                                                          
30 Ibid., 32.  
 
31 John E. Peck and Thomas R. Swartz, Op. Cit., 10. 
 
32 For a more complete discussion, see: Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, 
Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 
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expect any help from above. "The national government,” Reagan said, “should be 
worrying about arms control, not potholes."33      
 In his first State of the Union Address in 1982, Reagan expounded upon 
this idea by introducing what soon would be known as “The New Federalism.” 
Essentially, the federal government would assume responsibility for Medicaid, 
but only if states promised to assume the full burden of welfare and food stamp 
provisions. Additionally, other federal assistance programs would be phased out 
over a period of five years, after which states and localities would be expected to 
pay for them on their own.34 
 Although results on the ground were not as sweeping as Reagan had 
originally hoped for, many of his proposed domestic cutbacks did succeed in 
become law. Between 1980 and 1987, for instance, aid to urban areas fell by 
47%.35 This decline was especially notable given the fact that, during this time, 
the budgets of most other federal programs actually increased. Additionally, low-
income entitlement spending was cut by half during the 1980s, leading to the 
strange phenomenon of increasing poverty in the midst of economic recovery. 
Indeed, by 1986, the metropolitan poverty rate had expanded to more than 20%; 
                                                          
33 Ronald Reagan, “State of the Union Address,” Center for Public Policy Research. 26 January 
1982. Web. 28 December 2010 . 
 
34 Ibid. 
 
35 Dale Crane, “Devolution, fiscal federalism, and changing patterns of municipal revenues: the 
mismatch between theory and reality,” Journal of Public Administration, Research and Theory 14 
(2004) 524.                                                             
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higher even than during the recession years of mid 1970s.36 By 1984, liberal 
activists had begun to warn of a permanent underclass being created among 
America’s urban industrial centers. Alluding to the famous agricultural blight of 
the 1930s, they called this disturbing new trend “The Rust Bowl.”37 
Survival of the Fittest: New Federalism and Geographical Competition 
 Today, views of Reagan’s domestic policies differ widely across the 
political spectrum. However, amongst most observers, there is broad agreement 
that new federalism represented a major change in the way the central government 
interacted with localities.38 While previously, government grants were distributed 
largely on a basis of need, they now tended to favor competition and efficiency.  
With an overall reduction in domestic aid, there was a corresponding rise in the 
distribution of block grants; packets of money intended for the sole benefit of a 
single geographic area. As a rule, these grants were typically awarded to 
whichever region promised to leverage federal funds in the cheapest, most cost-
effective manner.39  
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Although this method of distribution was seen by some as the result of 
poor planning, it was actually an essential component of New Federalist ideology. 
If localities were forced to fight for their money in an open market, the theory 
went, then each would have no choice but to operate in a frugal and efficient 
manner.40 As one current governor recently suggested, "Competition works. Let 
them come up with their best plans, compete against the other regions and we will 
fund the most creative plans."41 Essentially, by introducing the powerful incentive 
of financial ruin, the government could make sure that only the best and most 
cost-effective strategies rose to the top. Once these strategies became known, 
other localities would be forced to imitate them in order to receive money. In this 
way, the most optimal distribution of resources could be achieved through the 
powers of supply and demand, leaving the central government free to pursue 
other, more appropriate matters.    
Thus, it is generally acknowledged that, by the 1980s, there was an 
increasing emphasis on interregional competition across much of the United 
States.42 As localities faced the twin pressures of globalization and 
deindustrialization, they could no longer count on help from above, and would 
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instead have to compete against each other for resources in the open market. In 
this sense, the concept of geographical place became an increasingly important 
notion within many economic circles.43 According to these thinkers, the 
distribution of resources was becoming increasingly defined along spatial lines; 
one region’s gain was another region’s loss. In this zero-sum game, the regions 
that could out-produce and out-innovate their competition would end up 
becoming successful on the global stage.44     
Regional Clusters: A New Model for a New Economy 
As communities struggled to adapt themselves to these changing 
conditions, many drew inspiration from a developing school of economic thought, 
known in academic circles as “New Regionalism.”45 Essentially, the theory 
claimed that, with rising competition at the local level and decreasing assistance 
from above, the region would soon replace the locality as the most effective and 
innovative geographical unit . In the words of Michael Porter, an early proponent 
of this theory, “The enduring competitive advantages in a global economy lie 
increasingly in regional things—knowledge, relationships, motivation—that 
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distant rivals cannot match.”46 In other words, by pooling their collective 
resources, cities could be “scaled up” into regional entities. Then, once these 
regional partnerships were established, participating cities could expect distinct 
competitive advantages against localities that had failed to form such networks. 
For these new regionalist thinkers, then, the secret to attaining economic stability 
was almost zen-like in its message: in order to compete, regions first would have 
to learn to cooperate.    
Certainly, for cities interested in new regionalist theory, the goal of 
increased cooperation was easier said than done. Before cities could begin acting 
as a regional unit, they first would have to build the necessary bonds of solidarity 
and trust. In the business world, this repository of good will and shared 
responsibility was known as “social capital,” and after 1980, it became an 
increasingly important concept in regional development.47 For prospective 
regions, the options for generating social capital were numerous and, among these 
options, there were no sure-fire methods for success.  
Increasingly, as the decade wore on, more and more places would begin to 
turn to the concept of heritage as a rallying point for regional cooperation. By 
building a sense of shared identity around a common history, communities could 
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begin to develop a sense of regional pride that would allow them to operate as a 
larger whole.   
Heritage Areas: A Golden Opportunity  
With their emergence during the early 1980s, heritage areas were very 
much a reflection of changing economic and fiscal realities. By emphasizing 
regional cooperation, they hoped to allow former industrial cities to compete in an 
increasingly competitive global climate. Also, by focusing upon the role of 
history and sense of place, heritage areas attempted to enhance social capital and 
create a sense of regional solidarity.48 As Mike DeWine, a Senator from Ohio, put 
it, “Together, we can accomplish more than working separately. Together, we are 
linked by geographical proximity and a shared heritage, and if we can only realize 
this, there is literally nothing we cannot do.”49   
Of course, the heritage area movement is a large and diverse program, 
and, in analyzing its development, it is necessary to avoid over-generalizations 
and claims that cannot be supported by direct evidence. Therefore, in the 
following chapter, I present a case study of the Illinois and Michigan Canal 
Corridor, the nation’s first heritage area. In it, I show how a group of struggling 
manufacturing towns managed to transform themselves into a fully-functional, 
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thriving regional network. By bringing together the diverse interests of 
environmentalists, businessmen, and politicians, the I&M Canal was able to build 
a regional consensus that would have been impossible just decades before. In 
doing so, it would sow the seeds for a much larger movement in the years to 
come. 
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Chapter 2: A Bold, Precedent-Setting Concept 
The Story of the Nation’s First Heritage Area 
“It is time to give us our money back!”                                                                                                   
– James Thompson, Governor of Illinois  
 
 Shortly after 2pm on August 17, 1982, three men in business suits filed 
into the central offices of the US Department of the Interior. The men, all 
Congressmen from Illinois, were on a mission to seek administrative approval for 
what they called a “national heritage corridor,” a sort of “industrialized national 
park” that would run along the eastern confines of Chicago’s outer suburbs.50 The 
plan was a remarkably clever one, but even so, its approval seemed very much in 
doubt. Over the past 18 months, the Office of the Interior had become a place 
where preservationist ideas went to die, and for this, no one was more responsible 
than the Interior Secretary himself.   
 “James G. Watt,” wrote Salon Magazine “was the man that 80s-era 
environmentalists loved to hate.”51 Never one to mince words, he had taken office 
with the simple pledge to “Mine more, drill more, and cut more timber.” There 
was no reason, he argued, why national park lands shouldn’t be opened up for 
logging and drilling. After all, in Watt’s opinion, the Bible had given man the 
right to use Earth as he saw fit. For preservationists, Watt felt only scorn. "If the 
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troubles from environmentalists cannot be solved in the jury box or at the ballot 
box,” he once angrily declared, “perhaps the cartridge box should be used."52 
 For these reasons, few thought Watt would support any plan whose stated 
purpose was to preserve and protect a geographic landscape, especially one which 
required federal dollars. Therefore, when the three Illinois Congressmen emerged 
from Watt’s office with his full, enthusiastic approval, the general atmosphere 
was split somewhere between elation and bewilderment.53 After three years of 
hectic planning and consensus-building, Illinois was finally on its way towards 
receiving the economic help it so desperately needed. Even better, it had 
succeeded by beating the Reagan administration at its own game. 
An Idea is Born 
 When Gerald Adelmann, age 29, arrived in Lockport, Illinois, after a 
break from his doctoral studies in Washington DC, he returned home to a 
community in decline.  The year was 1979, and a worldwide energy crisis had 
already begun to cripple the local Texaco oil refinery, Lockport’s largest 
employer.54 Unable to turn a profit, the plant would close its doors forever just 
two years later. In nearby Joliet, the situation was even worse. US Steel and 
Caterpillar Manufacturing were on the verge of financial collapse, and 
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unemployment had already shot up past 10%, soon to reach 25%.55 Mr. 
Adelmann, however, had not come to Illinois to address these current economic 
woes. Instead, he had come to study a distant and much more profitable past.  
 The Illinois and Michigan Canal was generally regarded as one of the 
most important public works projects of the 1800s.56 Completed in 1848, the 96-
mile canal linked the waters of the Mississippi to the shores of Lake Michigan, 
providing the final inland connection between the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of 
Mexico (Appendix, Figure 3). In just a few decades, the canal would help 
transform Chicago from a muddy frontier town of 20,000 people to a bustling, 
world-class city of almost half a million. At its peak, the canal would haul over a 
million tons of freight per year and would require the full-time service of 132 
barges.57 After 1900, however, the canal fell into steep disrepair, and by the 1970s 
it had become an industrial waste heap of abandoned locks and crumbling 
foundations.58  
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 At some point, walking among these aging relics, Mr. Adelmann was 
struck with a profound idea.59 This old canal had once breathed life into the 
economy of northern Illinois; why, then, couldn’t history repeat itself? Instead of 
each individual community trying to come up with a solution on its own, why not 
come together around a shared piece of infrastructure; especially one that was 
already built? Through his studies, Adelmann had seen firsthand the power of the 
man-made environment to shape a region’s image, and with the I&M Canal, he 
was determined to make his vision a reality. "He was the only guy in the whole 
Chicago area,” a Tribune journalist would later write, “who saw the potential in 
making a major recreational area out of an industrial junkyard."60                                      
A Stroke of Good Fortune 
 As it turned out, Mr. Adelmann was not the first to express interest in the 
old, broken-down canal corridor. Judith Stockdale, executive director of the Open 
Lands Project, a non-profit agency devoted to preserving open space in the 
Chicago area, had been trying for years to figure out what to do with it.61 The 
resources of the canal were intriguing, but the surrounding area was simply too 
developed and built-up to be considered for a traditional public park. Even worse, 
each community and business along the canal seemed to have its own, conflicting 
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ideas about how to use it. Thus, by 1979, when Ms. Stockdale received word of 
possible new grant money coming in from Washington, all thoughts of the canal 
had left her mind. “I had no idea of what project to apply for," she would later 
recall, "but the very next day, I got a call from this person named Jerry 
Adelmann.”62   
 Adelmann convinced Open Lands to take a second look at the canal and 
its surrounding townships. A national park, he admitted, was infeasible. The very 
idea of the federal government trying to preserve a bunch of used car lots and 
industrial waste sites was laughable at best. Still, he argued, what if the canal 
were to adopt a new way of looking at things? Instead of landscape preservation, 
why not focus on landscape creation?63 If townships had a common theme to rally 
around, then perhaps enough social and economic capital could be generated to 
get things flowing again. All along the canal, he explained, there were hidden 
gems of prosperity, both natural and historic, just waiting to be discovered. By 
itself, each little town did not have much to offer, but together, they would be a 
force to be reckoned with.  For a region long used to being thought of as “the 
armpit of Chicago,” the biggest remaining hurdle was to convince these 
communities of their own potential. 
Spreading the Word: John Husar and the Power of the Bully Pulpit  
                                                          
62 Ibid. 
 
63 Adelmann, Op. Cit. 
29 
 
 John Husar, or “Big John,” was a large, thirty-ish man with a sunny 
disposition and a deep, infectious laugh. He worked as a sports and recreation 
reporter at the Chicago Tribune, and it was said that he could write about 
“anything, anywhere, with clarity, brilliance and above all, zeal.”64 An avid 
outdoorsman, he had an almost child-like reverence for the natural beauty of 
Illinois; a reverence which, when combined with his knack for storytelling, could 
move even the most idle of readers. In other words, he was exactly the sort of man 
Jerry Adelmann needed to promote the cause of the Illinois and Michigan canal.  
Early in 1980, Adelmann, now employed by Open Lands, approached the 
boisterous writer with a modest request for assistance. What he got was a 
commitment so impressive that it would forge the bonds of a 20-year-long 
friendship. 
“Jerry, I’m gonna work with you on a series,” the newspaperman declared, 
leaving little room for equivocation. “It’s gonna take three months and it’s gonna 
be in depth. I have the power of the ‘bully pulpit’ and I know most of the major 
players… would you be willing to work with me?”65  
For most of the spring and summer, the two men rambled across the Des 
Plaines River Valley, surveying properties and talking with local stakeholders. In 
September, their efforts were rewarded with a five-part Chicago Tribune series 
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titled “Illinois: Our Hidden Wilderness,” which received critical acclaim and was 
featured on several front pages.66 The region, it seemed, was finally becoming 
proud of itself again.  
Meanwhile, in Washington DC, Open Lands had managed to convince a 
sympathetic park service official by the name of John Piene to help formulate a 
management plan for the new project.67 In just a few short months, the corridor 
idea would be ready to share with the general public. First, though, it would have 
to be pitched to a much less receptive audience. 
Convincing Businesses 
 In mid-20th century America, there was a distinct sense that the ideal of 
preservation was in conflict with the reality of innovation, and that a community 
could embrace one or the other but certainly not both.68 As such, most 
businessmen had developed a keen and visceral distrust of any agency seeking to 
“look after” or “interpret” their land. This distrust was directed towards 
government, but also towards non-governmental agencies like Open Lands, 
whose stated mission was to preserve and protect the natural landscape of Illinois.    
In fact, just ten years earlier, Open Lands had earned the ire of local 
businessmen by lobbying against construction on Mooselake Prairie, a prime 
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patch of real estate just south of Joliet.69 Not surprisingly, when a couple of self-
described “wide-eyed zealots” came rolling into town a decade later and 
announced their plans for a new regional park, the business community did not 
exactly welcome them with open arms. “There was a real sense,” Adelmann 
recalled, “that we were just some wealthy Chicagoans coming down and trying to 
tell them what to do….you know, that we were stealing their land under cover of 
darkness.”70   
 A series of corporate-sponsored breakfasts in Chicago, organized to 
mollify the concerns of big business, did not fare any better. "The reaction was 
chilly to hostile," remembered George Overton, president of Open Lands.71 
With factories closing and unemployment skyrocketing, the last thing 
companies wanted to hear about was more regulation and more government 
control.  Faced with a difficult situation, Adelmann and Open Lands decided to 
create a spin-off organization to help bolster their cause. Originally called the 
Upper Illinois Valley Association (UIVA), its job was to bring together 
various members of the business community and convince them that, far from 
preventing innovation, a new heritage corridor would actively encourage it. 
 Day after day, proponents of the corridor hammered away at the same 
message: the designation would not impose any new land use or environmental 
                                                          
69 Ibid.  
 
70 Ibid. 
 
71 Grant Pick, Op. Cit.  
32 
 
controls. No land would be owned, and all preservation efforts would be 
strictly voluntary in nature. This was a kinder and gentler form of preservation, 
they argued; one that was not at all opposed to progress or free enterprise.72 In 
other words, this was not your grandfather’s national park.   
 During the summer and fall of 1981, Adelmann and the National Park 
Service worked hard to create a proposal that would be acceptable to everyone 
involved. As the months dragged on, a few key themes began to emerge. 
Unlike national parks, partnership and cooperation would be key. The NPS 
would help with funding and technical matters, but all policy initiatives would 
originate on the ground. This way, local groups could have real influence over 
the governing commission, which would be split evenly between government, 
business, and non-profit sectors. Over time, this openness to all viewpoints 
began to win over many earlier detractors. Unlike previous activists, they 
noted, Adelmann didn’t come across as some sort of fanatic.73 One Chicago 
CEO, marveling at this newfound truce between businessmen and 
environmentalists, observed smugly that, “This [kind of thing] could never 
happen in a place like Russia.”74  
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 As 1981 gave way to 1982, a small but growing segment of the 
business community had placed itself firmly behind the project. The UIVA 
board began to fill up with CEOs and presidents from some of America’s 
largest corporations. Caterpillar Tractor, Amoco Chemical and Inland Steel 
were just a few of the big names that attached themselves to the project.75 In 
doing so, these manufacturing giants signaled their belief that the corridor 
could regain its former glory, and that all it needed was a change of image.  
“Image and quality of life are among the most important concerns for the 
retention of industry,” wrote Inland Steel VP George Ranney in a 1982 op-ed, 
“The improved amenities will help attract residents and jobs.”76 Indeed, according 
to the calculations of the Three Rivers Manufacturing Company, a new heritage 
corridor would directly create 700 jobs and leverage almost a million extra dollars 
in federal and state taxes.77 Just from the publicity alone, they argued, Illinois 
manufacturing could be put back on the map. As one executive would later say, 
''It was a good idea for business. We were competing for employees with other 
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geographic areas. Certainly the environment and the vision for the future (of the 
area) had some role in attracting people.''78 
By the spring of 1982, virtually everyone with a say in the matter was 
behind the heritage corridor proposal.79 The previous October, Open Lands and 
the NPS had released an official proposal, and a revised form of the plan was 
already being drafted for introduction to Congress.  For the bill’s supporters, 
however, the hardest road still lay ahead. With the exception of John Piene and a 
few of his colleagues, support from the park service was lukewarm at best.80 The 
Interior Department, with its ongoing budget-slashing measures, promised to be 
an even tougher sell. Somehow, proponents of the plan would have to convince an 
anti-environmentalist, anti-bureaucratic administration that a heritage area would 
be a good idea. Luckily, over the past few months, advocates for the canal 
corridor had managed to gain some powerful political allies.   
 
Senator Charles Percy: A Friend in Need is a Friend Indeed 
When freshman senator Charles Percy of Illinois was introduced to the 
public in the mid 1960s, it was, by all accounts, a case of love at first sight. 
Young, handsome, and charismatic, the Senate’s new golden boy was seen as the 
Republican’s answer to the Kennedys. In 1968, just two years into his first term, 
he was briefly considered for the vice-presidential slot under then-candidate 
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Richard Nixon. Six years later, after Watergate cleared the republican field, there 
was even talk of Percy himself ascending to the highest office.81 
As the years wore on, however, much of Percy’s luster began to fade. As 
ranking member and later Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Percy was criticized for spending more time in Cairo, Egypt, than in Cairo, 
Illinois.82 There was a strong sense, Adelmann recalled, that Percy had begun to 
lose touch with his constituency. While people back home were struggling with a 
sinking economy, Percy was spending his time abroad, rubbing shoulders with 
blue-blooded aristocrats at fancy state dinners. If Percy wanted to be re-elected, 
he soon realized, he would need to start bringing home the bacon; and with 
challengers already lining up, there was little time to waste. 
Although he himself was preoccupied with foreign affairs, Percy 
appointed a young aide by the name of Jim Keene to scour Illinois for potential 
spending projects. Luckily for Open Lands, Keene happened to be one of John 
Husar’s many “connections,” and after a brief tour of the canal region, the young 
staffer was sold. Almost immediately, Senator Percy latched onto the project with 
a ferocity that only a politician in trouble can muster. Somewhat awkwardly, 
Percy was joined in his endeavor by republican Representative Tom Corcoran, his 
rumored challenger in the upcoming primary campaign. Together, the two men 
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formed a powerful lobbying front, and it was they who set up the pivotal meeting 
with Secretary Watt in August of 1982. 
The Big Sell 
Realizing the potential difficulty of asking for a new government project 
in the midst of a recession, the Illinois delegation made a daring move. Instead of 
trying to get Watt and company to act against their will, they would attempt to 
convince them that the plan was actually in the best interests of the federal 
government.  
The heritage corridor, they declared, was the epitome of New Federalism, 
and therefore symbolized everything that the new administration was fighting for. 
The plan, they argued, was “efficient,” “cost-cutting,” and “locally controlled”; all 
buzz words in the new federalist lexicon.83 Unlike a national park, which required 
millions of dollars of assistance and a huge federal staff, the proposed heritage 
corridor would  ask for a mere 250,000 dollars a year, plus expenses for brochures 
and other promotional material.84 More importantly, the plan promised to give a 
boost to some of America’s largest corporations, an effect that certainly would be 
felt beyond the borders of Illinois. If the plan was successful, they concluded, then 
the old model of heavy-handed park service intervention was dead; an outcome 
that all true conservatives could celebrate.  
 Despite all this high-powered lobbying and careful planning, most 
observers were nevertheless surprised when Watt emerged from the August 
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meeting and declared the plan to be “a bold, precedent-setting concept” worthy of 
his full support.85 In fact, Watt’s support was so enthusiastic that it nearly scared 
away some of the bill’s liberal backers. Eventually, however, the bill’s supporters 
managed to walk the political tightrope and shepherd the bill through Congress 
without significant opposition.86  
A Dream Come True: The Nation’s First Heritage Area 
Shortly after 2:30 pm on August 24, 1984, President Regan strode into the 
grand ballroom of the Chicago Conrad Hilton, flanked by a quartet of smiling 
Illinois representatives. Briefly pausing to ink his signature, Regan praised the 
new corridor as a model of cooperation, stating, “We believe this activity will 
stimulate tourism, jobs, and economic growth, as well as greater cooperation 
between local, State, and Federal Governments.”87 After five years of stress and 
uncertainty, the vision of Jerry Adelmann had finally become a reality. 
With its designation, the I&M Canal Corridor quickly would become a 
living testament to the powers of regional thinking. By creating partnerships 
between traditionally antagonistic factions, the corridor had proved that old 
political and economic divisions could be transcended in the name of 
geographic unity. As Adelmann would put it several years later, “The corridor 
created a new ethic and a new way of thinking about planning in this 
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community. It is a region today, and it never was.''88 Additionally, by treating 
the federal government as a “stimulating agent” rather than as a sole provider 
of wealth, the corridor had been able to win the backing of an administration 
largely opposed to more traditional means of government assistance. Now, 
officially designated as a heritage area, the I&M Canal could begin the long 
process of retooling its economy along lines more conducive to 21st century 
success (Appendix, Figure 4). 
In the four years following this first designation, three more regions would 
join the ranks of the heritage area movement. In 1986, the Blackstone River 
Valley Corridor was approved by Congress, encompassing the area between 
Providence, Rhode Island and Worcester, Massachusetts. Two years later, 
Pennsylvania would receive two heritage areas of its own, one near Pittsburgh and 
the other near Philadelphia. Like the I&M Canal, these three new heritage areas 
all were struggling industrial areas, and like the I&M Canal, they all hoped to 
build a sense of shared regional ethic around a common historical theme.89  
However, as late as the early 1990s, the heritage area program was still 
somewhat of a nebulous concept. As one park service official would later recall, 
“The first few, I think, were arguably experimental. It was a new concept and I 
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am not sure Congress knew exactly what they were doing.”90 In other words, 
while these regions believed in the benefits of cooperation, they weren’t yet sure 
what those benefits would be. New regionalism was an appealing concept, but it 
lacked the hard, empirical evidence needed to back up its claims of financial 
effectiveness.  
As the decade unfolded, however, a remarkable new development in the 
world of tourism would begin to lend a sense of drive and purpose to a program 
badly in need of direction.  
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Chapter 3: Profiting From the Past 
 “Marketing battles are not fought in the customer’s office or in the supermarkets 
or the drugstores of America. Marketing battles are fought in a mean and ugly 
place. A place that’s dark and damp with much unexpected territory and deep 
pitfalls to trap the unwary. Marketing battles are fought inside the mind.” 
- Al Ries and Jack Trout, “Marketing Warfare,” 1986 
 
Tourism, of course, is not a new phenomenon. In fact, the idea of 
travelling to other places in order to gain a sense of enjoyment, fulfillment, or 
wonder is at least as old as recorded civilization itself. However, during the last 
half of the 20th century, tourism would be transformed from an innate human 
tendency into a multi-billion dollar global industry.91 Moreover, in the United 
States, as a new generation of baby boomers matured, tourism would assume a 
much more emotional quality than it had in the past. In an increasingly complex 
world, many people would begin to search for meaning and authenticity in the 
places that they visited. In effect, these travelers hoped to return to their roots, and 
they would be willing to pay a significant amount of money to do it.  
As these new trends in tourism became widely accepted, the heritage area 
movement gained an important source of economic legitimacy. Already imbued 
with clearly defined themes and shared visions of the past, many heritage areas 
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found themselves in a prime position to begin selling their image to these 
prospective new tourists. By using their existing network of grassroots activists, 
they felt they could leverage the relatively limited assistance of the National Park 
Service and turn it into a much greater source of revenue. Suddenly, a program 
which had seemed limited in scope now seemed limitless in possibility.      
An Unexpected Development 
During the early 1990s, observers began to notice a remarkable trend 
occurring amongst the nation’s four existing heritage areas. Heavy industry had 
not returned, at least not to the degree hoped for by some of the program’s 
original planners.92 However, in its place, a new wave of tourists had come 
rushing in, infusing fresh life into previously struggling economies. While tourism 
had always been a goal of the heritage area project, its stimulating effects were 
developing much sooner and much more powerfully than almost anyone had 
expected.  
In the nine short years between 1983 and 1992, tourism revenues in the 
Blackstone River Valley Heritage Corridor skyrocketed, from $76 million to 
nearly $200 million.93 Polluted rivers were slowly improving, new jobs were 
pouring in by the hundreds, and morale was higher than it had been in decades. In 
northeastern Illinois, a similar phenomenon had revived the fortunes of the Illinois 
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and Michigan Canal region. By the mid-1990s, an estimated five million tourists 
were visiting the heritage corridor every year, helping to fund a wide array of 
downtown revitalization projects.94 “I used to think people [in the new areas of 
town] didn’t even know there was a downtown,” quipped Bruce Szafraniec, a 
Lemont retailer, in a 1992 Chicago Sun-Times article, “now I look out on the 
street on Saturday and wonder, 'Where are all these people coming from?'"95 
In what can only be described as an incredible stroke of good fortune, the 
heritage corridor project had managed to stumble across an emerging trend much 
larger than anything its original planners could have imagined. With the simple 
act of authorization, heritage areas had tapped into a deep undercurrent of desire 
within the American psyche; a desire for simplicity, authenticity, and above all, 
meaning.     
An Inexplicable Yearning: Baby Boomers and the Search for Enlightenment 
After a brief challenge during the late 60s and early 70s, consumer culture 
in America had come roaring back with a vengeance during the 1980s.96 Baby 
boomers, no longer the fresh-faced idealists of decades past, were now faced with 
the challenges of middle age: holding down jobs, paying mortgages, and raising 
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families.  For most, the idea of open rebellion against the existing economic and 
social order was unthinkable, the relic of a naïve and long-forgotten youth. And 
yet, even as baby boomers grew to accept the realities of the modern world, the 
relationship was never an easy one. In their desire to escape the monotony of 
everyday existence, many baby boomers found themselves challenging the system 
in small but meaningful ways.97 While their duties at the workplace were non-
negotiable and their responsibilities at home inescapable, their leisure time was 
theirs alone to do as they pleased. Vacations, in particular, offered baby boomers 
a chance to mix things up and rediscover some of the magic of their adolescence. 
For those in search of deeper social and cultural meaning, the traditional 
vacation hotspots of the 1980s had little if anything to offer. Week-long getaways 
to theme parks and island resorts were pleasurable, but to many, they represented 
a mere extension of the faceless, commercialized world from which they had 
fled.98 In order to truly put the mind at ease, vacations needed to excite the spirit 
along with the senses. As one vacation planner put it, “We need to go back to our 
roots and understand what makes us unique and what makes up our heritage. We 
need to see beautiful places and do authentic things.”99 
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This paradigm shift in vacation planning, from the pleasure-seeking to the 
spiritual and knowledge-seeking, was remarkably swift. In 1982, Travel and 
Leisure Magazine commissioned a poll asking travelers to list what was important 
to them when planning a trip.  A mere 27% of respondents listed “Visiting 
cultural, historical, and archeological treasures” as important motivators. Ten 
years later, however, the polling agency conducted a follow-up survey which 
showed that number nearly doubling to 50%. Even more striking, the proportion 
identifying “understanding culture” as a major component of vacation planning 
jumped from just 48% to 88%.100  
As more and more studies confirmed this trend from escapism towards 
personal enrichment, some very important people began to take notice. In an 
ironic twist of fate, a movement heavily opposed to consumerism and 
commercialism would end up serving the needs of a tourism industry hungry for 
profit.  
Cultural Heritage Tourism 
During the 1990s, the phrase “cultural heritage tourism” was developed to 
describe these recent trends in vacation planning. At the time, the growth of this 
new niche market was more than double that of the rest of the tourism industry, 
which itself was one of the fastest emerging sectors of the global economy. 
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Defined as “people who travel to experience places, artifacts, and activities that 
authentically represent the stories and people of the past,” cultural heritage 
tourists were seen as a new breed of traveler; one with intense loyalty and a 
remarkable propensity to spend.101  
In 1997, a study by the Traveler’s Association of America showed that 
cultural heritage tourists spent an average of $615 per trip compared to $425 for 
all other tourists.102 Another study in Virginia returned similar results, showing 
that heritage travelers stayed, on average, one-and-a-half times longer, visited 
twice as many places, and spent two-and-a-half times as much money.103 Not 
surprisingly, cultural heritage tourists tended to be older, wealthier, better 
educated, and had more free time. Perhaps most importantly, heritage tourists 
were shown to be highly passionate and self-motivated, needing little in the way 
of outside prodding to explore their surroundings. "It’s different creature than 
regular tourism," remarked Carole Summers, cultural heritage tourism coordinator 
for the Kentucky Department of Travel. "They [the tourists] will drive through 
miles of back roads just to find a fried bologna sandwich at a general store 
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somewhere."104 In short, cultural heritage tourists were the tourism industry’s best 
friend.  
As the decade progressed, more studies were released showing the real, 
on-the-ground benefits of cultural heritage tourism. In Georgia alone, 
rehabilitation of historic properties between 1992 and 1996 created 7,550 jobs, 
$201 million in earnings, and $559 million in total economic impact.105 In 
Florida, total annual in-state wealth creation from heritage travelers was estimated 
to be over $4 billion,106 and in Colorado, the state tourism board calculated that 
every dollar spent on tourism leveraged an extra 12 in revenue.107 The industry 
was especially appealing to rural areas, which did not have the technological or 
labor capital needed to sustain other forms of economic revitalization.  
For regions hoping to obtain the benefits of heritage tourism, however, 
there were some organization hurdles standing in the way of success. For one, in 
order to attract visitors, communities would need to develop an entire network of 
coherent and well-organized themes; themes which were broad enough to appeal 
to a wide audience but distinctive enough to stand out from the crowd. In a world 
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where consumers were faced with increasing product choice but decreasing 
decision time, this ability to differentiate was seen as a key necessity in the 
advertising world.108 Thus, in order to cut through the “commercial clutter” and 
reach the mind of the consumer, tourist destinations would have to provide a 
message that was both unique and memorable. In the words of Stephen Pike, a 
senior lecturer at the Queensland School of Tourism, the most important question 
for a region to ask itself was, “What experiences can we offer that the consumer 
can’t find anywhere else?”109 
In addition to uniqueness, heritage tourist destinations would need to be 
perceived as authentic. This obsession of tourists to get behind the scenes and 
“observe the real thing” was seen by many academics as the outgrowth of an 
economy based on personalization and customization.110 To heritage tourists, the 
prime reason to travel was to gain personal insight and enlightenment, and this 
could only be done in places that had been left unspoiled by the clumsy hands of 
commercialism. Thus, the minute a place became “discovered” and 
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“commoditized,” it would lose its personal meaning, therefore becoming 
undesirable.111   
Finally, new studies were beginning to show that heritage tourists were 
repelled by traditional, top-down methods of learning. According to Richard 
Prentice, an early pioneer in heritage tourism theory, regions could not hope to 
“teach” their history to prospective visitors. Instead, they would need to 
encourage a more individualized approach to learning, allowing the visitor “to 
discover ‘hidden’ worlds, to seek adventure, to admire grandeur, to share secrets, 
to sample flavors and to uncover mysteries.”112 In this sense, host regions were 
not seen as educators, but rather as coequal partners in the search for personal 
enlightenment. As one travel agent put it, the message of a community would 
have to change from “What can I do for you?” to “What can we do together?”113    
In trying to fulfill these three requirements of distinctiveness, genuineness, 
and interactivity, heritage tourism destinations were faced with somewhat of a 
paradox. They needed to sell themselves enough to get the consumer’s attention, 
but not enough to destroy the consumer’s image of untarnished authenticity. It 
was a fine line to walk, and it required a high degree of cooperation and 
collaboration among all the stakeholders within a region. In the past, local hotels, 
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museums, and parks could simply worry about maintaining their own specifically-
tailored images. Now, with entire regions being sold as “package deals,” each 
individual business would have to rely upon a much larger, community-wide 
message.114 In this new climate, a region’s thematic coherence was only as strong 
as its weakest link, and the ability to cooperate and collaborate was seen as vital. 
Heritage Areas: A Natural Fit for Heritage Tourists 
While other communities would have to build these partnerships from the 
ground up, heritage areas already had much of the necessary framework in place.  
During their drive to attain designation, heritage areas like the I&M Canal 
Corridor had already gone through the process of organizing various interests 
around a common historical theme. With their focus on regional cooperation, 
heritage areas had attained, in the words of one researcher, a “coherence of story, 
genre, style, credibility, and depth” that other, more fractured localities found 
difficult to match.115 Just as importantly, heritage areas had already gained the 
backing of the National Park Service, a well-known and highly respected agency. 
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For many regions, this support acted as a crucial “seal of approval,” lending a 
certain degree of credibility to their claims of national significance.116 
Considering this, it is no surprise that the first four heritage areas 
experienced an increase in tourism during the early 1990s. Almost without 
realizing it, they had managed to create a model perfectly suited to fit the 
demands of a new and increasingly popular national phenomenon.  
Tourism: A New Lease on Life for the Heritage Area Movement 
During a phone call with one high-level heritage area administrator, I 
asked him why tourism was such an attractive economic opportunity for many 
regions. The administrator, who asked to remain anonymous, paused thoughtfully 
before replying: 
Well, you get people that come from out of state, they open their wallet, they leave 
all their money here, and then they go home. They’re not part of the tax burden, 
their kids aren’t going to the school systems, their stuff isn’t going into the septic 
systems, but they’re leaving their money here.   
In other words, heritage tourism can be a real-life example of the benefits 
of new regionalism. In an era of scarce resources, tourism can offer a new chance 
for struggling communities to begin revitalizing themselves. By attracting 
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travelers from other regions, communities can gain revenue from increased 
visitation without having to pay the costs of an expanded population. In many 
cases then, heritage tourism is a zero-sum game played out along spatial lines; the 
more a region functions as a team, the better it can compete in the race to attract 
visitors. 
As the 1990s progressed, many communities would start to embrace this 
idea of enhanced economic competitiveness through regional cooperation. During 
the 1980s, regional heritage planning had been limited in scope and focused 
almost exclusively upon industrial areas. Now, however, the demand for these 
new “thematic parks” would begin to sweep across the country. Of these new 
parks, many were designated at the state or local levels.117 However, the largest 
and most desirable designations were still those at the national level, an exclusive 
domain of the National Heritage Area program.118     
Of these regions attempting to gain national designation, only a few were 
industrial areas with clearly defined regional histories like the I&M Canal. Others 
were more rural in nature and therefore did not share the same legacies as the first 
four heritage areas.119  Most intriguing, however, were the group of applicants 
with no regional identity at all; these communities wished to gain the benefits of 
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regional organization and heritage tourism, but did not have a coherent theme 
with which to market themselves. As a group of towns in eastern Connecticut 
would soon prove, however, this deficiency in regional identity was no barrier to 
designation. When faced with a distinct lack of existing historical narratives, the 
solution was simple: just create one. 
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Chapter 4: The Greatest Story Never Told 
The Remarkable Tale of The Last Green Valley  
 
“I can't imagine a nicer place to get lost in, or to fall off the map while 
springtime emerges all around. A string of lovely little towns hung together like cool New 
England pearls, the Last Green Valley is paradise on Earth….and not a mall in sight.” 
 - Annie Graves (Yankee Magazine) 
Tucked quietly among the green, rolling hills of eastern Connecticut and 
South-Central Massachusetts lays one of the most successful federal programs in 
recent memory (Appendix, Figure 5). Formally known as the Quinebaug and 
Shetucket Rivers Valley National Heritage Corridor (QSNRVHC), the region is 
more commonly identified by its friendlier and less imposing nickname: “The 
Last Green Valley of New England.”120  
For almost any other place, such a grandiose title might come across as 
overdramatic or cliché, but for the Last Green Valley (LGV), the name seems 
oddly appropriate. Indeed, upon visiting the corridor’s official website, one 
cannot help but be impressed by the breathtaking array of photos displayed there. 
From grassy meadows to freshly tilled hay fields and fog-shrouded forests, these 
photos invoke a powerful sense of pastoral nostalgia in the viewer, an effect made 
all the more poignant by a satellite image displayed on the website’s main page. 
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Taken at night, the photo shows the entire Northeastern Seaboard as one 
continuous chain of artificial light, unbroken except for a tiny island of darkness 
in eastern Connecticut; an island of unspoiled beauty within a sea of encroaching 
modernity (Appendix, Figure 6).  
To a traveler on the ground, the effect of entering the Last Green Valley is 
just as impressive. After the noisy cities and exhaust-choked interstates of 
Southern New England, the so-called “quiet corner” of Connecticut is a welcome 
relief. Even the people there seem more easygoing and community-oriented than 
their neighbors to the west, a stereotype that they are more than happy to 
perpetuate. Every year, this community spirit is put on proud display during the 
popular “Walktober” festival, an event which draws upwards of 20,000 people 
from both within and beyond regional borders.121 There are nature walks, canoe 
expeditions, hay rides, food tasting, and dozens of walking tours of famous 
landmarks. There are paintings, brochures, and even a “Last Green Valley 
anthem”; a folksy ballad that sounds as if it was written at least a hundred years 
ago.122 In fact, the whole region itself feels like some sort of anachronism, a 
throwback to a time when places had meaning and people had roots.  
If all this doesn’t sound familiar, it should. In offering a place for weary 
travelers to escape from the trappings of modernity, the Last Green Valley is an 
example of cultural heritage tourism at its finest. However, far from being a relic 
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of the past, the LGV (a name which wasn’t coined until 1993) is a symbol of the 
future. Before designation as a heritage corridor, the towns of eastern Connecticut 
and southern Massachusetts had little sense of shared history. In fact, rather than 
reflect a common heritage, the corridor was established to create one, primarily as 
a means of achieving economic stability. Initiated in 1994, the Last Green Valley 
marked the beginning of a new era in heritage area planning; an era where reality 
was no obstacle to the formation of image. More than anything, the Last Green 
Valley showed that, with a lot of planning and a little imagination, there was 
literally no limit to what a group of hard-working towns could achieve. 
The Rust Belt Comes to Connecticut 
For most Americans, the end of the Cold War was cause for celebration, 
but for workers in the defense industry, it was a sign that their jobs might soon be 
in jeopardy.123  During the Reagan administration, military spending had escalated 
at a rapid rate, creating opportunities for manufacturers of weapons, armored 
vehicles, and surveillance systems. Eastern Connecticut, in particular, had 
benefitted greatly during this period, where it was estimated that one out of every 
three jobs was directly dependent on the defense industry.124 Now, in the wake of 
proposed budget cuts by George Bush Sr., Connecticut was destined to experience 
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a major slowdown in its economy. Among those aware of the impending crisis, 
perhaps none were more nervous than eastern Connecticut’s lone representative in 
Congress, four-term Democrat Sam Gejdenson.  
Several years earlier, during the Republican tidal wave of 1984, 
Gejdenson had been labeled as an opponent of Connecticut’s defense industry, an 
accusation which had nearly cost him the election.125 Now, with the prospects of 
new economic discontent on the horizon, Gejdenson was determined not to be 
caught off guard once again. Together with Senator Joe Lieberman, he organized 
a congressional hearing on the economic future of Connecticut, a hearing which 
concluded that job losses in the manufacturing sector were unavoidable.126 In 
order to prosper, Connecticut would need to diversify and find new areas for 
potential growth. Luckily for Gejdenson, there was one sector of the economy that 
was showing surprising strength, and it was there that he focused his efforts as the 
next election approached. 
Build it and they will Come: Connecticut Tourism in the post-Cold War era 
Throughout most of the 20th century, eastern Connecticut was an 
afterthought in the minds of New England tourists. Those seeking culture and 
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history went to Boston or Newport and those seeking natural beauty went to the 
White Mountains or the Maine coast. Eastern Connecticut was written off as New 
England’s “quiet corner,” a reputation which tended to dissuade potential 
visitors.127 In the late 1980s, however, things began to change. An increasing 
number of travelers, many of them early cultural heritage tourists, began to 
“discover” the attractions of rural Connecticut. Unlike the more well-known areas 
of New England, eastern Connecticut hadn’t been overrun by tourists and 
commercial industries. Savvy travelers, always searching for the next big “off the 
beaten path” destination, saw rural Connecticut as the perfect place to shop, hike, 
or just relax. In many ways, the region’s lack of major attractions was is biggest 
attraction.128 
Representative Gejdenson was among the first to notice this trend. 
“Tourism is the one segment of the economy in eastern Connecticut that is 
growing,” he would later explain in front of Congress, “in part because we offer 
the New England atmosphere which so many hope to experience but which is 
increasingly difficult to find.”129  The question was: How could eastern 
Connecticut turn this modest trickle of tourism into a steady flow of revenue?   
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Gejdenson’s original answer was simple, and in April of 1988, he took his 
case to the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Connecticut, he 
explained, had the lowest proportion of publicly owned land in America. If the 
federal government would simply assist the state in creating a new system of 
parks and recreation areas, Connecticut could vastly improve the quality of life of 
its citizens while also attracting new visitors. The National Park Service, however, 
was not convinced. According to the organization’s regional director, federal 
management of open lands would be “counterproductive and costly to the 
taxpayer.”130 Connecticut would need to find a different way forward. 
It is unclear from the record exactly when Gejdenson arrived at his 
decision to turn eastern Connecticut into a heritage corridor. The Blackstone 
River Valley Corridor, situated directly east of Gejdenson’s own district, was a 
likely source of inspiration. So too was the I&M Canal Corridor, which 
Gejdenson had voted for during his second term in office. Either way, by the 
spring of 1989, Gejdenson’s plans were set, and unlike past heritage corridor 
proposals, this time the private sector lent its immediate support. A heritage 
corridor, they agreed, was the perfect opportunity for isolated towns to begin 
working together towards common goals. “Alone, we lack the resources to 
produce a coherent plan,” testified John D. Boland, chairman of the advisory 
committee established to investigate the matter, “in partnership with one another, 
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however, our strength is multiplied.”131 In fact, the plan seemed so good that it 
was easy to overlook its one glaring weakness; in order to have a heritage area, 
one first needed to have a heritage. 
Breaking the Mold: An Odd Fit for a Heritage Corridor 
During a phone call with Bill Reid, the Director of External Affairs for 
the Last Green Valley Inc., I asked him if the towns of eastern Connecticut had 
shared any sense of regional identity before their incorporation as a National 
Heritage Area. After two or three seconds of thoughtful silence, he slowly replied, 
“Well…no, not really.” 
Indeed, at the time of Gejdenson’s proposal, Connecticut was arguably 
the least regionalized state in the nation. By 1960, it had abolished all forms of 
county government, joining Rhode Island as the only state without functioning 
regional jurisdictions.132 Each township was largely self-sufficient, a reflection of 
that old “Yankee spirit of independence” so cherished by New Englanders. As for 
heritage, it was difficult to find one narrative that all towns could agree on. Some 
traced their history back to the early mill settlements, while others identified with 
a more agricultural past. Even the demography was split; many towns were still 
largely blue collar, while others had experienced a recent influx of wealthy 
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urbanites from out of state.133 In short, it would have been difficult to find a group 
of towns less suited to take on the challenges of becoming a heritage corridor. 
Another potential problem arose from the currently accepted definition of 
what a heritage corridor could be. Although there were no written guidelines, all 
previous corridors had been heavily industrialized, with high rates of 
unemployment. Eastern Connecticut, while certainly a hub for military 
manufacturing, was over 70% forested, with unemployment rates well below 
10%.134 Thus, unlike past heritage corridors, which simply had been trying to stop 
the economic bleeding, Connecticut was trying to jumpstart its economy before 
things went downhill. Rather than try and save manufacturing jobs, Connecticut 
was hoping to circumvent deindustrialization altogether by focusing its efforts on 
an entirely new sector of the economy. In this sense, heritage tourism more than 
just a means to achieve a larger end; it was an end.  
As the plan for the new heritage corridor began to take shape, its backers 
were faced with a difficult situation. In order to receive designation, they would 
have to create a sense of shared regional identity where none had existed before, 
and, with no similar corridors to act as a blueprint, they would essentially have to 
do it in a vacuum. 
The Last Green Valley: Building the Legend  
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On the Last Green Valley’s website, there is an official statement of 
distinction which outlines the region’s case for national significance. Residents of 
the Quinebaug and Shetucket River Valley (QSRV), it argues, had always known 
that they lived in a special place; they just had a hard time explaining why.  
Indeed, between 1989 and 1993, the QSRV seemed to embody a different 
historical narrative every week. At first, the corridor’s supporters emphasized the 
region’s old mills and factories, which they claimed had helped unleash a new age 
of American industrialization. Unfortunately, this message was uncomfortably 
close to that of the neighboring Blackstone Corridor, which billed itself as the 
“Birthplace of the American Industrial Revolution.”135 Unwilling to engage in 
such a costly “brand war,” the QSRV decided to develop a more generalized 
theme, calling itself “The transition area from ‘Puritan’ ideology to ‘Yankee’ 
ideology.”136 Unsurprisingly, very few people understood what this actually 
meant, and in April of 1993, the National Park Service stepped in to set things 
straight. Distressed by the region’s lack of a coherent narrative, it filed a report 
stating, “The historic, natural, and recreation resources make the QSRV distinct 
from other parts of Connecticut, but do not reflect national significance.”137 It was 
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clear that, in order to gain authorization, the valley would need a much more 
compelling story. 
Not long after the disappointing NPS report, a breakthrough came in the 
form of a 17-year-old document discovered deep within the state archives. Back 
in 1976, a commission called the Eastern Connecticut Resource Conservation and 
Development Project had conducted a land survey of southern New England. In 
their analysis of the data, they had briefly noted that the area between the 
Quinebaug and Shetucket Rivers was much less developed than the surrounding 
territory. In many ways, they noted, the area represented a kind of “last green 
valley within the Megalopolis.”138 Nearly two decades later, QSRVNHC Inc., the 
main interest group in favor of the corridor, stumbled across the old document 
while searching the state records for information.  After years of indecisiveness, 
the group finally had found the theme it was looking for. 
The name, they agreed, was perfect.  In just four words, it captured 
everything that had made the region attractive to heritage tourists in the first 
place. It implied authenticity. Green valleys were places of natural beauty, 
untouched by the corrupting forces of modernism. It also implied uniqueness. As 
“the last” of its kind, visitors were assured that they wouldn’t be able to find a 
similar experience anywhere else. More than anything, however, the name 
implied vulnerability; a sense of being under siege from outside forces beyond the 
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region’s control. For all those hoping to catch a glimpse of unspoiled New 
England, the name offered a kind of ultimatum: come quickly, or risk missing 
everything.  
The brilliance of the plan was in its flexibility. Rather than define itself by 
what it was, as previous corridors had, the Last Green Valley was defined by what 
it wasn’t. It wasn’t modernized or commercialized, and that’s what made it 
special. What is did stand for was left up to the individual towns themselves. 
Whether the towns chose to emphasize history or nature, mills or farms, it didn’t 
matter. As long as what they emphasized fell under the banner of “authentic New 
England,” the theme would remain intact. In this way, the diversity of the region 
was not a hindrance but an asset. With just one name, the Last Green Valley had 
finally forged an identity, and it was a formidable one. 
A New Breed of Heritage Corridor 
It did not take long for the new theme to catch on among the valley’s 
residents. Spurred on by the publicity efforts of a new interest group, the Last 
Green Valley Inc., more than 4,000 residents turned out over Columbus Day 
weekend in 1993 to celebrate the region’s heritage.139 During the next 12 months, 
private citizens and public officials came together to produce brochures, visitor’s 
guides, and press releases for local newspapers.  In just one year, volunteers 
logged more than 10,000 hours of service and more than 7,000 people took part in 
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the valley’s regional education programs.140 By the time the corridor bill reached 
Congress in the fall of 1994, the Last Green Valley movement had been 
transformed into a vibrant grassroots effort, unsurpassed by anything in New 
England. 
On November 2, just five days before the midterm elections, the 
QSRVNHC was designated by Congress. The vote was unanimous. Five years 
later, the valley was expanded to include nine towns in South-Central 
Massachusetts, bringing the total area to just under 1100 square miles.141 Today, 
the Last Green Valley stands as one of the most successful land use programs in 
the country, recently announcing its intentions to become entirely self-sufficient 
by 2015, a first among heritage areas.142 Situated less than 90 minutes from 
Boston and New York, it has become a magnet for heritage tourists, raking in an 
estimated $89 million over 15 years, compared to just $4.8 million spent by 
federal sources.143 More importantly, the Last Green Valley has developed into a 
distinct cultural region, something it never could have claimed just 20 years 
earlier. 
Through its designation, the Last Green Valley opened up a whole new 
realm of possibilities for the heritage area movement. Prospective regions no 
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longer had to be industrial wastelands with clearly defined histories in order to 
receive the benefits of heritage tourism. Rather, all a region needed was a 
compelling story and a strong grassroots movement to tell it. In this sense, it 
didn’t matter if the story was largely made up or opportunistic; in the race to 
attract heritage tourists, image was often more important than reality.  
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Chapter 5: Turning Ideas into Actions 
Are Heritage Areas Really Profitable? 
  
“If you want to understand democracy, spend less time in the library with Plato, and 
more time in the buses with people.”            -  Simeon Strunsky 
 
In attempting to gauge the profitability of the heritage area program, 
empirical data is decidedly difficult to come by. One survey, conducted in 2001 
by the Pathways of Progress Heritage Corridor in Pennsylvania, concluded that 
designation was responsible for the creation of 337 jobs and $18 million in annual 
revenue.144 Another study, commissioned by the Essex National Heritage Area in 
Massachusetts, showed an even larger impact: 3,500 annual jobs and $130 million 
in tourist spending.145 Finally, a statistical analysis by Michigan State University 
estimated that heritage areas had attracted 32 million total visitors, generated 
3,000 public-private partnerships, and netted 167,000 hours of volunteer service 
during the fiscal year of 2003.146 
                                                          
144 “Path of Progress Heritage System: Visitor Characteristics and Economic Impacts,” 
Westsyvania Heritage Corporation. 2002. Web. 4 February 2011. 40.                    
 
145 “Cultural Heritage Tourism 2008 Fact Sheet,” National Trust for Historic Preservation. March 
2008. Web. 4 February 2011.  
 
146 Daniel Stynes and Ya-Yen Sun, “Economic Impacts of National Heritage Area Visitor 
Spending,” Department of Community, Agriculture, Recreation and Resource Studies: Michigan 
State University. June 2004. Web. 31 January 2011. 4.                                                     
67 
 
Of course, with the exception of the MSU study, all of these quantitative 
analyses were conducted by organizations affiliated with heritage area programs. 
Therefore, because of the strong potential for bias, these results should be taken 
with a grain of salt. 
However, despite this lack of reliable empirical evidence, it can be fairly 
stated that, during the 1990s, there was a marked increase in the perceived 
profitability of heritage areas. Before the Last Green Valley, only four regions had 
been designated in 10 years. After the success of the LGV, however, there were 
19 designations in just six years.147 In fact, the flow of applications was so fast that 
Congress found itself unable to deal with them on a case by case basis. Instead, it 
was forced to combine several of the proposals into larger omnibus spending bills 
and pass them all at once. Clearly, something quite significant was driving this 
spike in national interest. 
A Quick Break from Theory 
Over the past few chapters, I have argued that the heritage area program 
was a logical response to newfound concerns over regional identity. These 
concerns, I believe, were driven largely by the forces of economic decline, 
geographical competition, new regionalism, and later, heritage tourism. Up until 
this point, my claims have been largely academic in nature, relying upon books, 
journal articles, and the occasional telephone conversation with park officials. 
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However, in January of 2011, I received an opportunity to attend an actual 
planning and strategy session for the Freedom’s Way National Heritage Area in 
New Hampshire. In doing so, I feel I was able to gain a degree of valuable first-
hand insight into why the heritage area movement had grown so popular. 
Freedom’s Way: The Anatomy of a Heritage Area 
When I walked into the meeting room, I was struck by how ordinary 
everything seemed. Here, in a tiny conference room in Milford City Hall, were 
seven men and women, sitting around a table so cramped that their arms and legs 
were nearly touching. As I took a seat, they introduced themselves as Freedom’s 
Way Inc., and then told me why they had arranged the meeting. Two years earlier, 
Freedom’s Way had achieved designation as a heritage corridor, stretching all the 
way from Concord, Massachusetts, to Southern New Hampshire. Now, in 2011, 
Freedom’s Way Inc. was working on formulating a management plan, which was 
due to the Secretary of the Interior in March of 2012. In order to complete this 
management plan, each town would need to conduct a formal resource inventory, 
explaining its cultural significance within the context of the larger region. At the 
time of the meeting, however, the process was running behind schedule, and 
Freedom’s Way Inc. was searching for ways to speed things up. After introducing 
myself, I sat back and listened to the committee deliberate.  
Almost immediately, the conversation turned to money. Apparently, 
Freedom’s Inc. was running low on funds and could no longer hire the 
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professionals needed to conduct each town’s resource inventory. Instead, it would 
have to rely on volunteer assistance, primarily from local historical societies. 
However, many of these historical societies had been reluctant to take on the extra 
work, and Freedom’s Way needed a way to get them excited about the heritage 
area concept. After discussing the problem, Peter, a local historical society 
member, offered his own opinion.  
“We need to sell this thing as something where everyone can benefit,” he 
said, “When people come to visit, they need to buy gas, they need to buy 
groceries…there’s revenue in this for everyone.” Richard, a local bookstore 
owner, nodded in agreement. “There’s nothing but gain in this for them,” he 
exclaimed, “This is the type of program that cuts to the bones of economic 
development…the more people know about their community, the more they take 
care of it and value it.”   
At this point, the group narrowed its focus to the town of Hollis, New 
Hampshire, a town that was ready for the next step in the planning process. 
Freedom’s Way wanted to help Hollis promote its resource inventory, but in order 
to do that, it would need a source of revenue. After a few minutes, the idea of a 
travel brochure began to emerge. Inside, it would offer a map of Hollis’ historic 
and cultural landmarks, along with a walking route for potential tourists to follow. 
“This is the kind of tourism I’m looking for; self-guided,” said May, a chamber of 
commerce official, “It’s interactive. They can go out with the kids and walk, and 
come back any time they want.” After printing the brochure, the revenue would 
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come by selling ad space to local businesses. Instead of actual ads, however, each 
business would pay to have its name and location highlighted in the historical 
map. “That way,” May explained, “we can advertise without really advertising.” 
Before this idea could be approved, however, Peter stepped in once again. 
“I think Hollis might want to have a say in this,” he argued, “We need to find a 
mover and shaker within the town. We can’t do this from the outside; it is a 
regional effort.” Celeste, treasurer of the Milford Historical Society, voiced her 
agreement. “Yes, we need to eradicate these imaginary lines and start working 
together.”  
Eventually, the group settled on a compromise. It would help to organize a 
steering committee of six Hollis residents, which would work alongside six 
members of Freedom’s Way Inc. By forming a partnership, the planners hoped to 
secure the right mix of professional experience and local enthusiasm needed to 
produce a successful brochure. According to Richard, this kind of regional 
cooperation was the wave of the future. “There is a national force afoot,” he said, 
“and we just need to find a way to ride it.” 
As the meeting drew to a close, I knew I had witnessed an extraordinary 
display of heritage area planning in action. In just 90 minutes, the members of 
Freedom’s Way Inc. had expressed many of the same thoughts and ideas I had 
been reading about for months. However, this time, those ideas had been 
expressed right in front of me, by real people with identifiable names and faces. 
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According to these men and women, the heritage area program was indeed an 
important mechanism for attracting tourism dollars. However, more than this, it 
was seen as a catalyst for community partnerships and a wide variety of 
coordinated activities at the local level. In a world where regional cooperation 
was an economic necessity, these planners saw heritage areas as a chance to begin 
breaking down artificial barriers and working together as a cohesive unit. 
Before the meeting ended, I expressed this viewpoint to the members still 
in attendance and asked them if they agreed with it. Peter, always quick to offer 
his opinion, provided an immediate answer. “Normally, I can’t even get 12 people 
to come to one of my meetings at the Brookline Historical Society,” he said, 
shrugging his shoulders, “but if we have a network in place, then we can start to 
get people excited. Essentially what this whole thing is is a funnel. It is there to 
help us do what we want, whatever that is.”  
A Closer Look 
With nearly 50 designations, no two heritage areas are the same, and it 
would be a mistake to assume that all of them are profitable. Furthermore, due to 
the lack of unbiased empirical data, the link between regional cooperation and 
increased economic competiveness is difficult to quantify. However, for the 
activists in Illinois, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, there was no doubt that 
these regions represented an opportunity to begin thinking as a team. By scaling 
up and forming inter-jurisdictional partnerships, these communities felt that 
72 
 
heritage areas could allow them to revitalize their economies and stimulate 
interest, both among residents and among tourists. Thus, to these places and many 
others across the country, the heritage area program was a decidedly good thing. 
However, a closer look at the program reveals some serious flaws. For one, 
as it grew more popular, it would become increasingly political in nature. Rather 
than reflect true national significance, designation was more often the result of 
vote trading or patriotic posturing. Furthermore, because of the haphazard and 
inconsistent criteria for designation, heritage areas would become easy to get, 
difficult to regulate, and almost impossible to get rid of. As the program grew 
ever more crowded, many people began to wonder: just where would it end?  
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Chapter 6: I Can’t Believe It’s Not Bacon! 
The Political Implications Behind Heritage Area Designation  
 
“Oh, I don't blame Congress. If I had $600 billion at my disposal, I'd be 
irresponsible, too.”      - Lichty and Wagner 
 
Inside the train car, Senator Ted Kennedy sat facing a small group of 
reporters, a bright smile etched upon his face. “Have you ever heard,” he asked 
jovially, pointing across the room to Congressmen Richard Neil and Peter Blute 
of Massachusetts, “A Republican say nicer things about a Democrat, or a 
Democrat say nicer things about a Republican?”148 Some of the reporters shook 
their heads in agreement. It was October of 1996, just three weeks before Election 
Day, and the bitter tones of partisanship were already evident across the country. 
Here in this train car, however, the unmistakable feelings of bipartisanship felt 
like a breath of fresh air to everyone on board.   
Just the previous week, a bill had passed through Congress reauthorizing 
the Blackstone River Valley Heritage Corridor while also expanding its borders 
into southern Massachusetts. The bill’s passage had been in jeopardy until the 
final moments, and it had taken the full cooperation of democrats and republicans 
to pull off the legislative victory. As a “thank you” gesture, private backers of the 
bill had staged a celebratory train ride from Worcester, Massachusetts to 
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Woonsocket, Rhode Island, at which point the two state delegations would meet 
in a triumphant show of unity.149  
As the train reached its destination, an excited throng of politicians and 
activists gathered around the platform to greet their guests from Massachusetts. 
First among them was Senator John Chaffee, an early and influential supporter   
of the original corridor plan. As he strode up to the train car, Chaffee gazed out at 
the sea of smiling faces and issued a mock groan of disappointment. Speaking just 
loud enough for reporters to hear, he grinned wryly, saying "Just my luck for all 
this to be happening when I am not running for reelection."150 
Although it was a lighthearted remark, Chaffee’s comment nevertheless 
revealed an important force behind the newly ascendant heritage area movement. 
As the perceived profitability of these areas became evident, more and more 
politicians saw them as an opportunity for political patronage. With a little 
persuasion here and a little compromise there, savvy politicians found themselves 
able to direct funds towards their districts at little to no political cost. While some 
legislators criticized this practice of “pork barrel” spending, many of them 
changed their minds when it came time for them to receive their own 
designations. After all, one congressman’s pork is another’s bacon.   
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Scratch my Back and I’ll Scratch Yours: The Art of Political Log Rolling 
 By the1990s, heritage areas had become a hot commodity on the political 
market, and the number of new designations rose accordingly. However, at first 
glance, this dramatic rise seemed counterintuitive. While certainly profitable, the 
effects of heritage areas tended to be localized and only felt by a handful of 
districts. Why on earth, then, would a representative from outside of a proposed 
heritage area vote to support one? With no possible benefit to one’s own district, 
why waste taxpayer money on such an obvious example of pork barrel spending?  
 The answer, it turns out, is actually quite simple. When representative A 
introduces a bill to obtain funding for his or her district, the bill’s passage 
represents a huge net gain for A but only a minor net loss for everyone else. 
Oftentimes, another representative, B, will agree to suffer this small loss and vote 
for the bill anyway. However, in doing so, B is not acting irrationally. Instead, by 
supporting the bill, he has essentially earned himself an “IOU” from A, the value 
of which far exceeds the price that B paid to get it. At some future date, when B 
needs support for a bill of his own, he may redeem this IOU in exchange a crucial 
vote. Thus, in this way, both sides end up getting what they want.151  
This strategy of give and take is known as “political log rolling.” Through 
its actions, pet spending projects, many of which would never pass on their own, 
can end up becoming law. Because of this, log rolling has become an increasingly 
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indispensible part of the legislative process,152 and, during the 1990s, it would 
serve as an essential tactic in the drive to establish new heritage areas.  
In 1996, Congress created an omnibus bill combining the proposals of 12 
different heritage areas.153 With so many regions slated to receive designation, the 
bill could count on the support representatives from across the eastern seaboard. 
However, representatives from west of the Mississippi were not so easily 
convinced. Heritage areas had not yet caught on in the Western U.S., a region still 
dominated by national parks, and many western legislators were still dismissive of 
the entire concept.154  
Thus, shortly before the bill came to a vote, one of western legislator, 
Senator Frank Murkowski of Alaska, decided to throw a wrench into the entire 
process. Using his position as Chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources 
Committee, Murkowski refused to let the bill come to the floor. Stating his 
opposition to the project, Murkowski nevertheless hinted that his support might be 
attainable; all Congress had to do was agree to a controversial provision that 
would allow commercial logging in Alaska’s Tongass National Forest. With 
Election Day fast approaching, a small group of eastern legislators reluctantly 
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agreed to a side deal with Murkowski, thus ensuring the bill’s passage.155 Log 
rolling, quite literally, had saved the day. 
An even more intriguing incident occurred in 1999 when the Last Green 
Valley was attempting to expand into Massachusetts, and to everyone’s surprise, 
Senator John McCain of Arizona went out of his way to endorse the plan. Just two 
years earlier, McCain had castigated the heritage area program as wasteful 
spending,156 but now he spoke out as one of its biggest supporters. The difference 
was that, this time, McCain had a heritage area of his own to endorse. The Yuma 
Crossing Heritage Area was due up for designation the following year and 
McCain wanted to build up as much good will as possible.157 Additionally, he had 
recently made the decision to run for president, a decision that would require 
support from key allies in the New England region.  
Acknowledging this fact, McCain jokingly asked that the corridor be 
expanded into New Hampshire, the first state to vote in the presidential primaries. 
“While we are moving,” quipped Joe Lieberman, who was also running for 
president and trying to attract support in the South, “why don’t we expand it into 
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South Carolina as well?”158 As the Senate chamber filled with raucous laughter, it 
became clear that, in the great legislative cog of Washington, a little elbow grease 
always comes in handy.  
Park Barrel Spending: A Bridge Too Far 
 Despite the success of the legislative compromises, the heritage area 
program soon found itself under attack from a variety of government watchdog 
groups. These groups, many of them aligned with the anti-bureaucratic 
“Sagebrush Rebellion” in the west, ridiculed what they saw as an outrageous 
waste of taxpayer funds.159  Eventually, these complaints from the private sector 
began to spill over into the halls of Congress, leading one Republican 
representative from Missouri to angrily declare that “Private property owners in 
this country are tired of dealing with government bureaucrats who attempt to 
classify mud puddles as wetlands and give kangaroo rats equal footing with the 
human species.”160  
Indeed, by the late 1990s, a movement that had begun with relatively little 
opposition now found itself the target of an increasing array of partisan attacks. 
As the new millennium approached, many observers began to wonder if the 
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heritage area project would end up collapsing under its own weight. In 2001, 
however, these questions were put on indefinite hold after the horrific attacks of 
September 11th forever changed the way that Americans thought about themselves 
and their surroundings. 
As American As Apple Pie: Heritage Areas in the Post 9/11 World  
 Any American old enough to remember the events of 9/11 will certainly 
recall the intense feelings of patriotism and pride that swept the country in its 
aftermath. Old scores were forgotten, internal conflicts were put on hold, and 
partisan divides were temporarily obscured. The drive to come together around a 
common set of values was overwhelming, and everywhere, people sought to 
define just what it was that made them American.161  
 Unsurprisingly, this drive to rediscover the roots of American identity 
played right into the hands of the National Heritage Area movement. Tourists, 
dismayed by the threat of additional hijackings, turned away from distant and 
exotic locales in favor of more intimate settings, preferring instead to visit places 
of local or regional importance.162 The heritage tourism industry, already enjoying 
spectacular growth, reached a whole new level of desirability. Indeed, by the 
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summer of 2003, heritage areas across the country were reporting record levels of 
visitation, a surge which many attributed to the recent attacks.163  
 Meanwhile, as visitation rates increased, political opposition from 
conservative groups suddenly vanished. Attacking symbols of American heritage 
after 9/11, they realized, would be akin to political suicide. Cognizant of this fact, 
new heritage areas began to embrace their status as American symbols, adopting 
titles like “Freedom’s Way,” “Freedom’s Frontier,” and “Journey Through 
Hallowed Ground.”164 Essentially, by playing up the theme of nationalism, they 
were rendering themselves immune from potential criticism. 
 Thus, by the beginning of the 21st century, the heritage area movement had 
found itself increasingly enmeshed in the messy world of politics. For many 
regions, the path to designation lay, not in improving the credibility of their 
theme, but rather in gaining the support of as many senators and representatives as 
possible. Essentially, support from the National Park Service was seen as a prize, 
and the regions that could lobby and organize most effectively were those most 
likely to win it. In this sense then, the emerging competition between regions was 
not only economic, but political as well. 
 Up until the present day, however, this competition for heritage area 
designations was not viewed as a zero-sum game. Indeed, with 49 bills and 49 
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votes of passage,165 there certainly seemed to be enough room in the program for 
everybody. However, in recent years, there has emerged the ever-growing threat 
of overexpansion. With no clearly defined criteria for what constitutes national 
significance, virtually any region can become a heritage area. Furthermore, with 
no enforceable means of cutting funding, a region, once designated, remains on 
the federal payrolls indefinitely. Thus, unless things change from their current 
path, the heritage area program will soon run out of money, and if it does, the 
regions slowest on their feet will be left with nothing. 
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Chapter 7: No More Room at the Inn 
The Coming Crisis in the Heritage Area Movement 
 
“When everyone is special, no one is.” - The Incredibles 
 In October of 2010, I spoke with Heather Scotten, assistant coordinator for 
the National Park Service’s heritage area program. After a few minutes of 
conversation, I asked her if the program was in danger of outgrowing the 
relatively limited amount of funds set aside to support it. “I think that’s a great 
question,” she replied candidly, “and it’s something that we’re really struggling 
with as a program.” In her opinion, the popularity of the heritage area movement 
was incommensurate with its financial support, and barring a change in the 
designation process, the National Park Service would be unable to keep up. 
 The following week, I spoke to the other assistant coordinator, Katie 
Durcan, and received a similar response. “Our biggest challenge,” she said, “is 
our own success. Just since 2006, our program has doubled in size, but the 
funding has remained the same. The math just doesn’t add up. We have 49 areas, 
each trying to reach the million dollar funding cap, and we only have a $17 
million budget……17 divided by 49? Well, you get the picture.”  
 Clearly, among those closest to the program, there is a growing concern 
that the heritage area movement is unsustainable. This unsustainability, however, 
goes far beyond simple concerns of funding and resources. Rather, the problem is 
systemic; from the moment a region applies for designation to the moment it is 
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scheduled to stop receiving funding, the entire process is awash in subjectivity, 
irregularity, and above all, inconsistency.    
The Slippery Slope of National Significance 
 In 1994, a group of congressmen introduced a bill that would establish 
criteria for the designation of new National Heritage Areas. One such requirement 
was a clearly-worded definition of the term “national significance,” which until 
then, had been left up to each individual region to define on its own terms.166 The 
problem with this, according to the bill’s sponsors, was that the process was 
entirely subjective. In the words of Representative John Duncan, “Why, you can 
come up with a historical reason to designate just about any place in the 
country.”167 With more than 800,000 buildings, objects, and structures listed on 
the National Register of Historical Places, there was literally no limit to what a 
region could use to justify its significance.168 Because of this, the designation 
process was necessarily dependent upon political factors rather than historical 
ones, a situation which the backers of the bill found unacceptable. 
Although this drive to establish a consistent designation process was 
supported by the park service, it would nevertheless fail to be approved by 
                                                          
166 US House, Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands, Hearings on HR 3707: To 
establish an American Heritage Areas Partnership Program in the Department of the Interior. 22 
March 1994. 103
rd
 Cong., 2
nd
 Sess. Web. 28 December 2010. 123.           
 
167 US House, Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests and Lands, Hearings on HR 1280: To 
establish guidelines for the purpose of National Heritage Area Programs and other purposes, Op. 
Cit., 11.   
 
168 US House, Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands, Op. Cit. 116. 
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Congress. Over the next 17 years, no less than eight different bills would be 
introduced to remedy the situation, and not a single one would pass.169 This 
gridlock was encouraged by many leaders of the heritage area movement, who 
feared that a standardized designation process would hamper the efforts of a 
program defined by its creativity and diversity.170  
For supporters of the standardized approach, however, these protestations 
from heritage areas were nothing short of ridiculous, and in 2003, Senator Craig 
Thomas of Wyoming decided to take his concerns to the Senate floor. Addressing 
Kathryn Higgins, Vice President of Public Policy for The National Trust for 
Historic Preservation, he asked her if the entire designation process was not just a 
thinly veiled excuse to stimulate economic development. When she replied that 
designation was more about partnership and local activity, Thomas responded, 
“Well, do you not suppose that there are more than 40 little towns across the 
United States that could use some main street activity? If there is going to be no 
criteria, then why can’t I sign up for a few [heritage areas] in Wyoming?”171 For 
Thomas and others, there seemed little reason why some areas should be deemed 
“significant” enough to receive federal help while others should not.  
                                                          
169 Katie Durcan, Op. Cit.  
 
170 US House, Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests and Lands, Op. Cit., 49. 
 
171 US Senate, Subcommittee on National Parks, Hearing on S.311: To Conduct Oversight on the 
Designation and Management of Heritage Area, Op. Cit., 27.  
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A Backwards Process 
 In addition to defining national significance, each heritage area is required 
to submit a management plan to the Secretary of the Interior outlining its overall 
theme and administrative structure. However, rather than submit it before 
designation, each region’s management plan is not due until three years after its 
initial establishment.172 Thus, when Congress votes on a proposal, it often has 
little idea about how a given region actually will be operated. With few details to 
criticize, opposition is frequently limited, and among all 49 heritage area 
proposals introduced to Congress, not a single one has ever been voted down.173 
 For many critics, this process of “planning after designation” was 
decidedly inefficient. Rather than allowing regions to justify their existence after 
the fact, they argued that heritage areas should be forced to make their purpose 
clear right from the start.174 However, despite these objections, the heritage area 
designation process would remain unchanged. 
A Never-ending Commitment   
 In their enabling legislation, most heritage areas are designated with so-
called “sunset provisions.” Essentially, these provisions authorize funding for a 
certain period of time, usually 10 to 15 years, after which the region is expected to 
                                                          
172 Katie Durcan, Op. Cit. 
 
173 Heather Scotten, Op. Cit.  
 
174 US Senate, Subcommittee on National Parks, Hearing: To Conduct Oversight on National 
Heritage Areas. 30 March 2004. 108
th
 Cong. 2
nd
 Sess. Web. 29 December 2010. 28.      
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stop relying upon federal money and support itself. However, although many 
heritage areas are more than 15 years old, no sunset measures have ever been 
invoked.175 Rather, when regions reach their funding limit, they almost always 
apply for reauthorization in order to gain another 10 to 15 years of federal 
support. One heritage area, the Illinois and Michigan Canal, has even been re-
authorized twice.  In most cases then, these supposed deadlines are largely 
meaningless, and what begins as a temporary means of assistance can often turn 
into a never-ending commitment. 
However, while demands for funds have been steadily increasing, actual 
assistance has not. Between 2004 and 2010, the heritage area program received an 
average annual budget of approximately $15 million.176 On February 11, 2011, 
however, President Obama called for a 50% reduction in heritage area spending in 
response to growing concerns over the federal budget deficit.177 With the NPS 
already suffering severe losses, the administration hoped to free up more funding 
for the country’s national parks, and to do this, other efforts such as the National 
Heritage Area program would have to be de-prioritized. As of April 2011, no 
decision has been made by Congress, but even if Obama’s cuts are rejected, it 
seems only a matter of time until the heritage area program feels the effects of an 
increasingly tough fiscal climate. 
                                                          
175 Heather Scotten, Op. Cit. 
 
176 Ibid.  
177 “NPS FY 2012 Budget at a Glance,” National Park Service. 14 February 2011. Web. 2 April 
2011.  
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Looking Forward: Future Problems for the Heritage Area Program 
 For nearly 30 years, the heritage area program has managed to survive 
with a haphazard, shoestring approach to the designation process. When resources 
were abundant, this subjective and inconsistent model often was ignored, largely 
because every proposal that came to a vote succeeded in achieving designation. 
With a 100% success rate, few regions had any inclination to register complaints. 
However, with a shrinking base of resources, the heritage area program will 
almost certainly be forced into making some difficult decisions. If, at some future 
point, the park service feels the need to begin supporting some regions and not 
others, then suddenly, the inconsistent and political nature of the program will 
begin to become more problematic. In essence, the federal government would be 
supporting geographical regions simply because of their superior lobbying and 
organizational skills, a situation which would call into question some of the very 
basic tenets of new regionalist development.  
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Conclusion: The Never-ending Struggle 
“Don’t hate the player, hate the game.” – Unknown   
 
 With its emphasis on celebrating cultural identity, the heritage area 
program obscures what is, in reality, a much larger struggle to attain the benefits 
of regional cooperation. By using heritage as a rallying point for a wide variety of 
grassroots activities, many communities feel that they can build the vast networks 
of social capital needed to survive in an increasingly austere economic climate. In 
this sense then, heritage area designation often serves as an important spark. With 
the legitimizing support of the National Park Service, local communities can 
begin to leverage their vague feelings of shared identity into more tangible 
economic results.  
 As with any new fad, however, latecomers often are excluded. With 
increasing demand for funding and a finite supply of resources, the heritage area 
program is nearing a point where it will no longer be able to accept new 
designations. At this point, the federal government will find itself supporting 
some regions in their quest to achieve geographical competitiveness while leaving 
others behind. Furthermore, these regions will be receiving support, not because 
of their historical worthiness, but rather because of their ability to recognize 
economic trends and act on them more quickly than their neighbors. Thus, in 
many ways, the heritage area program is simply an extension of the competitive 
new federalist ethic that emerged more than thirty years ago.    
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 Of course, in looking at heritage areas, it is easy to criticize them as 
inherently unfair or objectionable. However, in a larger sense, it is difficult to 
blame these communities for wanting to ensure their economic survival. In a 
world where public-private partnerships and regional coordination are essential, 
one region’s gain is often another region’s loss, and places that fail to adapt are 
likely to get left behind.   
Thus, in the end, any unfairness must not be blamed upon individual 
regions or even upon the heritage area program as a whole, but rather upon the 
basic realities of resource apportionment. For as long as governments have 
existed, they have always had the unenviable task of distributing a finite amount 
of wealth to a virtually endless amount of interests. The only difference is that, 
today, these interests are being defined less by ideology and class, and more by 
geography. Certainly, in looking at the heritage area movement, it is legitimate to 
criticize the disingenuous and misleading manner in which it has been carried out. 
However, in the grand scheme of things, heritage areas are just one possible 
solution to a struggle as old as civilization itself.    
After all, though the rules may have changed, the game remains the same.         
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Figure 1: National Heritage Area designations through 2006. Regions are 
numbered chronologically by date of designation. Note the high density of NHAs 
east of the Mississippi River, especially in the urbanized Northeastern corridor.  
Source: http://www.naturalclimatechange.us/GlobalGreenDictatorship.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Total number of NHA designations over time. Note the relatively slow 
rate of increase before 1995 and the comparatively fast rate of increase after 1995.  
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Figure 3: The Illinois and Michigan   
Canal. Completed in 1848, the canal 
stretched 96 miles from Chicago to 
La Salle, connecting Lake Michigan 
to the Illinois River. Today, the 
I&M Canal National Heritage 
Corridor comprises 450 square miles 
of land on either side of the now 
defunct canal.  
Source: Illinois State Archives 
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Figure 4: Timeline of I&M Canal Corridor Designation overlaid with a graph of 
Illinois state unemployment between 1976 and 1986. Note how the entire 
planning stage occurs during a period of severe rising joblessness.  
1. Jerry Adelmann pitches plan to Open Lands 
2. “Illinois: Our Hidden Wilderness” published in the Chicago Sun Times 
3. Official Heritage Area Plan Drafted by the NPS and Open Lands 
4. Heritage Area Bill introduced to Congress 
5. Meeting with Secretary Watt 
6. Congressional Hearing 
7. Illinois and Michigan Canal NHC officially designated by law 
Source: US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics  
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Figure 5: A map showing the 
extent of the Quinebaug and 
Shetucket River Valley 
National Heritage Corridor 
(Last Green Valley). The 
original 1994 designation 
included 26 towns in 
Northeastern Connecticut, 
and was expanded in 1999 to 
include nine additional towns 
in Massachusetts. 
Source: Last Green Valley, Inc. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: The satellite photo   
displayed on the Last Green 
Valley’s official website. It 
attempts to depict heritage 
corridor as the sole breach in 
the metropolis between 
Boston and Washington DC.  
Source: Last Green Valley, Inc.  
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CAPSTONE SUMMARY 
 
Background Information 
 National Heritage Areas (NHAs) are federally approved entities, 
affiliated with but not directly administered by the National Park Service (NPS). 
In a very broad sense, NHAs exist to showcase the natural, historical, and cultural 
resources of a particular geographic region. By raising such awareness, the 
program hopes to preserve these “nationally significant” landscapes for future 
generations to understand and appreciate. 
However, unlike their close cousin, the National Park, heritage areas are 
not owned directly by the federal government. Although all heritage areas are 
approved by Congress, the NPS acts as a purely advisory body, providing 
technical and monetary support to regions that request it. In this relationship, the 
federal government is unable to impose environmental standards or land-use 
restrictions of any kind, and all activity within the region ultimately derives its 
legitimacy from local sources. In this sense, heritage areas represent a new trend 
within the National Park Service, one which is focused less upon top-down 
control and more upon cooperation and partnership across multiple jurisdictions. 
In recent years, heritage areas have become quite popular, especially 
among urban areas in the eastern United States deemed unsuitable for national 
parks. Over the past 30 years, 49 NHAs have been designated by Congress, and 
today, nearly one-third of Americans live within the confines of these regions. 
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Despite their increasing ubiquity, however, heritage areas have generally been 
dismissed as insignificant by the general public. Furthermore, academic literature 
on NHAs is decidedly sparse, and the articles that do exist tend to focus 
exclusively upon the local and regional benefits of designation.  
However, as I attempt to show in my paper, I believe that the NHA 
program is a reflection of much deeper changes occurring within the American 
political and economic system. As federal assistance grew increasingly scarce 
after 1980, there was a distinct trend towards inter-regional competition in the 
United States. By forcing individual communities into direct competition with 
each other, the government created a system in which the ability of a locality to 
out-innovate and out-compete its neighbors was necessary for its long-term 
financial stability. In this environment, the concept of geographical place became 
progressively more important, and increasingly, communities found the need to 
pool their collective talents in order to succeed on the national stage. Thus, while 
there was a trend towards competition among regions, there was a simultaneous 
trend toward cooperation within regions.  
By helping communities to coalesce around shared regional themes, 
heritage areas often acted as important tools in this struggle to obtain scarce 
economic resources. With the legitimizing support of the NPS, many communities 
felt that NHAs could provide the spark they needed to begin working together as a 
regional entity. In other words, heritage areas were more than just abstract 
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representations of culture and history: they were tangible mechanisms to stimulate 
cooperation and collaboration in a competitive economy.  
Behind these seemingly useful benefits, however, heritage areas also 
represented a more troublesome reality. With its haphazard setup, NHA 
designations were a highly subjective process, guided more by the whims of 
politics than by any substantive claims of national significance. Furthermore, with 
limited funding, those closest to the program realized that the rapid pace of 
designations would soon become unsustainable. Still, as of 2011, no efforts to 
address these problems have been adopted.  
Thus, with these distressing realities, a few important questions about the 
overall nature of NHAs must be raised: If every region can be nationally 
significant, then what is the ultimate purpose of the program? Is it simply to 
promote economic development through intra-regional cooperation and increased 
visibility? If the goal is indeed to improve regional competitiveness, then is it fair 
for the federal government to give some regions a leg-up and not others? If 
funding does run out, which regions will be left with designations and which 
regions will be left with nothing? 
Ultimately, I conclude that, given its current setup, the NHA program is an 
inherently exclusionary movement. By helping some communities in their quest 
to attain comparative geographical advantages, the park service is essentially 
providing a few select regions with the tools needed to out-compete their 
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neighbors. However, in making this point, the paper does not attempt to impose a 
value-judgment one way or the other. Rather, by providing a clear and truthful 
account of current developments, it simply hopes to uncover a side of the NHA 
program that has so far not been made clear to the general public.                                                                            
Methods Used 
 In making sense of the NHA program, I attempted to enlist the support of 
both primary and secondary research materials. In the early stages of the project, I 
relied primarily upon existing books and articles to help build up a background of 
knowledge on the subject. Next, once I had a firm grasp of the nature of the 
program, I made an effort to speak with a variety of experts in the field. Over the 
next several months, I held in-depth conversations with both NPS officials and 
academic observers, and in January of 2011, I was able to attend a planning 
session for the NHA in my home state of New Hampshire. Finally, I was fortunate 
enough to speak with Gerald Adelmann, the man generally credited with the 
creation of the heritage area concept. Through these conversations, I was able to 
supplement my secondary research and transform my ideas into something more 
concrete and reliable.  
 Additionally, because the NHA program is extremely large and diverse, I 
found it necessary to take a more inductive approach towards understanding it. To 
this end, I focused the majority of my research upon three individual heritage 
areas. By choosing three areas with significantly different backgrounds, I 
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attempted to gain as wide an understanding of the program as possible given my 
limited time and resources. Furthermore, with personal contacts in all three of 
these regions, I was able to utilize first-hand accounts largely unavailable from 
the other 46 regions. 
 Lastly, in telling the story of the NHA program, I made a conscious 
decision to deviate from the traditional methods of academic discourse. In my 
mind, the intended audience of this paper was not fellow researchers, but rather 
intelligent and inquisitive members of the general public. Considering this, my 
writing style was generally more informal and dialogue-based than most 
undergraduate theses. By engaging with my audience in such a manner, I hoped to 
make my arguments more accessible and enjoyable to the average reader.  
Significance 
 As an object of study, NHAs transcend the limitations of any single field 
of academia. In their expression, they can be analyzed from a variety of different 
viewpoints, from the scientific to the conceptual, and everything in between. With 
my paper, however, I attempt to show that, rather than economics, politics, or 
history, it is geography which ties the stories of these regions together. Other 
fields may be able to explain the individual components of heritage areas, but it is 
only through geographical analysis that a deeper understanding of the larger 
whole can be reached. In a very real sense, it is these spatial interactions between 
regions that give the movement its real significance and meaning.   
106 
 
 Thus, with this paper, my goal is not only to raise awareness about a 
fascinating federal program, but also to provide readers with an introduction to 
the discipline that I value so deeply. By leading them through a careful and 
thoughtful examination of a specific problem, I hope to show that geography is 
more than an academic discipline; it is a way of thinking about and engaging with 
the broader world. 
